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J. C. Saves in '76 9 1 mitted t o him. At the same time, the California, Massachusetts , and Ne w York suburb s tha t ha d th e highes t proportio n o f New Clas s voters pun ished Carte r fo r hi s apparen t socia l conservatism . Th e upper-incom e "McGovern counties " foun d For d t o b e mor e ideologicall y acceptabl e than Carter . I n what ha d becom e a political truism sinc e '68, whenever a presidential candidat e di d poorl y i n affluen t precincts , h e score d wel l i n white working-class neighborhoods. Carter's twenty-one percentage-poin t gain ove r McGover n i n the blue-collar precinct s mor e tha n mad e u p fo r the loss of upper-middle-class socia l liberals. Carter ha d organize d labor , and a poor economy , t o than k fo r hi s decisive win amon g workers. (Or , as George Meany observed, "Carter's biggest asset is that the vast majorit y of the American peopl e hav e no respec t fo r Ford . H e has no class ; he's a fumbler. H e comes through a s a symbol of mediocrity.")63 Viewing himsel f a s a resurrecte d Roosevelt , Carte r ha d kicke d of f hi s fall campaign at FDR's vacation home in Warm Springs , Georgia. Usually, a Democrati c presidentia l candidat e launche d th e fal l electio n seaso n b y marching i n th e Detroi t Labo r Da y parade . Michigan , however , wa s Ford's hom e stat e an d Carte r fel t mor e a t eas e i n th e Southland . Sinc e Carter kne w that th e unio n vot e was in hi s pocket, h e had th e luxur y o f being abl e t o plac e som e distanc e betwee n himsel f an d a city that man y white southerner s di d no t regar d a s quit e American . (Detroi t serve d a s the headquarter s o f th e UAW , spawne d libera l Republican s lik e forme r Michigan governo r an d automobil e executiv e Georg e Romney , an d ha d earned th e nickname "Murde r City.") 64 Buoyed b y Carter's victory, his staffer s crowe d tha t the y had reconsti tuted the New Deal electoral coalition. Blacks, white southerners, workers, Catholics, an d Jew s ha d al l vote d fo r Carter . The n again , member s o f those group s als o vote d fo r Ford—some , lik e whit e southerner s an d Catholics, almost evenl y dividing their vot e between th e two presidentia l candidates. Carter beat Ford by just two percentage points, hardly a landslide worthy o f FDR or LBJ . Carter face d a country that, regardles s o f its religious fait h o r lac k thereof , place d littl e confidenc e i n th e publi c schools, labo r unions , th e Suprem e Court , Congress , bi g business , an d the media . Th e majo r economic , government , an d socia l institution s o f the countr y di d no t inspir e trust . Carter—muc h lik e Reagan—played t o the voters' scorn for professional politician s and Washington bureaucrats. One o f th e potentia l shortcoming s o f Carter' s strategy , though , wa s tha t he needed th e help of the very constituency groups that he had implicitl y defined a s being par t o f th e problem . NOW , th e NEA , an d th e 700,00 0 J. C. Saves in '76 91 mitted to him. At the same time, the California, Massachusetts, and New York suburbs that had the highest proportion of New Class voters punished Carter for his apparent social conservatism. The upper-income ((McGovern counties" found Ford to be more ideologically acceptable than Carter. In what had become a political truism since '68, whenever a presidential candidate did poorly in affluent precincts, he scored well in white working-class neighborhoods. Carter's twenty-one percentage...

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