Breaking the Devil’s Pact: The Battle to Free the Teamsters from the Mob

6. General President Carey and the IRB: 1992 – 1997

103 6 General President Carey and the IRB 1992–1997 The IRB will act as a constant foe of corruption and a vigilant agent of union democracy. . . . [R]egardless of a particular administration ’s stance toward reform, the IRB will serve as a perpetual agent of those reforms independent of the parties, vigilant in the fight against corruption, and stalwart in the promotion of union democracy.1 —Judge David Edelstein, August 19, 1992 I simply want to dispel the notion that the [Carey administration] is doing everything that is possible here to take care of things and clean out their own house.2 —IRB member Frederick Lacey, June 28, 1993 Ron Carey’s inauguration as IBT general president in February 1992 and the IRB’s assumption of disciplinary authority later that year seemed to augur well of greater cooperation between the IBT and the court-appointed officers. The IRB’s chief investigator (CI) would investigate union corruption and, when appropriate, recommend disciplinary charges. If the three IRB members decided to accept the CI’s recommendation , they would refer charges to the jurisdictionally appropriate IBT unit, monitor compliance, and, if necessary, take action to ensure compliance. For this phase of the consent decree to work effectively, the IBT would have to carry out its disciplinary duties in good faith. Contrary to the expectations of the DOJ lawyers, Judge Edelstein, and the court officers, the Carey administration was frequently uncooperative. 104 General President Carey and the IRB Carey’s appointee to the IRB unreasonably delayed the selection of a third IRB member. Carey’s general counsel opposed DOJ’s proposed rules for the IRB’s operations. And Carey’s staff obstructed the IRB’s routine requests for compensation and reimbursements. Claiming a desire to demonstrate the IBT’s independent capacity and willingness to fight corruption and racketeering, Carey appointed an Ethical Practices Committee (EPC) to investigate, charge, adjudicate, and sanction disciplinary violations. He also imposed international-union trusteeships on nearly seventy IBT locals because of alleged corruption and/or fiscal mismanagement. Carey’s supporters praised these initiatives, but critics accused him of using the EPC and trusteeships to punish political rivals. The IRB and Carey’s Resistance The EO certified the 1991 election on January 10, 1992, one month after final balloting.3 Except for pending cases, to be completed by the IO/IA, the IRB took over disciplinary duties on October 10, 1992.*4 AUSA Randy Mastro explained that the transition from the IO/IA to the IRB reflected the parties ’ intention that, whereas the IO and IA functioned as wholly independent disciplinary enforcers, the IRB would share disciplinary enforcement responsibility with the IBT. The IRB would concentrate on investigations and oversight, while the IBT would charge, adjudicate, and, where appropriate , impose sanctions. The consent decree provided that DOJ would appoint one IRB member, the IBT would appoint another, and those two appointees would choose the third member.5 In March 1992, DOJ appointed IA Frederick Lacey, and the IBT appointed Eddie Burke, Carey’s 1991 campaign manager and then special assistant. When Lacey and Burke could not agree on the selection of a third IRB member, Judge Edelstein granted Lacey’s request, over Burke’s objection, to appoint former FBI and CIA director William Webster. Soon thereafter, Judge Edelstein decided that Burke was too much a part of Carey ’s administration to properly carry out the role of a “neutral” IRB member . Carey replaced Burke with Grant Crandall, formerly the United Mine Workers’ general counsel. * For clarity of exposition, the authors treat the beginning of the IRB’s work as January 1, 1993. General President Carey and the IRB 105 The IRB’s Disciplinary Powers: Procedures and Cases (1992–1997) The consent decree vests the IRB with the same investigatory authority as the IBT’s general president and general secretary-treasurer; empowers the IRB to hire investigative staff;6 and requires the IRB to investigate allegations of corruption, organized-crime control or influence over any IBT entity, and failure to fully cooperate with the IRB.7 In July 1992, before Webster’s appointment, DOJ proposed comprehensive rules to govern the IRB’s investigations, adjudications, enforcement of decisions, staffing, and communication with the rank and file (see fig. 6.1). Those rules authorized the IRB to investigate allegations of bribery, extortion, embezzlement, violence , aiding or abetting racketeering acts, knowing association with Cosa Nostra or persons barred from participation in...