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10 The Political Econom y of Post-Worl d War II Japanese Development : A Rent-Seeking Perspectiv e Shigeto Naka, Wayne T. Brough, and Kiyokazu Tanaka Introduction After Worl d Wa r I I Japa n experience d ver y rapi d economi c growth whil e maintainin g a stabl e democrati c politica l regime. * When th e America n Occupatio n o f Japa n ende d i n 1952 , Japa n was economicall y insignificant . Toda y Japan i s a not onl y demo cratic , but als o a rich an d technologicall y advance d nation , wit h its per capita income exceeding those of many Western countries. Many attempts have been made to explain postwar Japan's economic an d politica l miracles . Broadl y speaking , tw o school s o f thought hav e emerge d (se e Patric k an d Meissne r 1986) . The first emphasizes the uniqueness of Japan's sociopolitical institutions in coordinating Japan' s industria l policies . It maintain s tha t Japa nese bureaucrats provided the optimal mix of a market system and a command system. The second school of thought focuses purely on the technica l relationship s amon g economi c variable s t o explai n Japan's growth . Its proponents asser t tha t th e growth of postwa r Japan was mainly a market phenomenon. Neither of these views is 256 Post-World Wa r II Japanese Developmen t 25 7 satisfactory. Th e sociopolitica l approac h fall s shor t becaus e o f it s methodological inconsistency , whil e th e neoclassical-economic growth approac h i s weak because of its institutional vacuum . In thi s chapter , w e us e a n alternativ e framewor k t o analyz e and explai n th e growt h o f Japan' s politica l economy. 1 Ou r analy sis draw s upo n th e theor y o f publi c choice . Thi s theor y utilize s the rational-choice mode l t o analyze th e interaction s betwee n pri vate an d politica l markets . I t hold s tha t th e stat e i s a nexu s o f contracts i n whic h self-seekin g individual s interac t wit h on e an other fo r persona l gain , a n assumptio n consisten t wit h th e behav ior o f marke t participants . Further , becaus e suc h interaction s take plac e fro m withi n a constitutiona l framework , a n analysi s o f institutional structure s i s necessary . In th e cas e o f moder n Japan , th e rule s o f th e gam e wer e sig nificantly altere d b y th e Occupatio n force s (1945-52 ) a s a resul t of World Wa r II . The change destroye d th e nexu s of contracts tha t had comprise d th e Japanes e stat e an d create d institutiona l insta bility ; Japanes e politica l operative s wer e force d t o adjus t thei r behavior. However , onc e thes e adjustment s wer e made , a stabl e nexus o f contract s emerged , a s observe d b y th e stabilit y o f th e political regim e i n th e subsequen t postwa r years . I t ca n b e sai d that th e sociopolitica l stabilit y i n postwa r Japa n wa s structurall y induced b y th e Occupatio n forces . How di d Japa n mov e fro m disequilibriu m t o a stable , ne w equilibrium? I n thi s process , wha t rol e di d th e Occupatio n force s play? Wha t di d Japanes e politica l operative s d o to gain o r protec t their interests ? I n analyzin g thes e questions , w e introduc e th e main thesi s o f this chapter : tha t is , under th e structur e o f the ne w equilibrium, ren t seekin g becam e relativel y mor e efficien t tha n i n other industria l nations . B y efficien t ren t seekin g w e mea n tha t the socia l cost s o...

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