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Index
- NYU Press
- Chapter
- Additional Information
| 263 9/11 attacks, 138 2008 market meltdown, 123–124 accountability: corporate governance, reform of, 32; detection risk, 33; deterrence of corporate crime, 33; of prosecutors , 8, 186–191, 190–191; of regulatory agencies, 8, 190–191; of shareholders, 11; of state Attorneys General (AGs), 186–187; of U.S. Attorneys, 189–190 Accountability in Deferred Prosecutions Act, 118, 121, 256 agencies. See regulatory agencies AIG, 112, 121–122, 126, 183, 187 Alexander, Cindy R.: dollar value of criminal fines imposed on corporations, 31; duration of corporate crime, 30; employee turnover in fraud cases, 27; governance reform in pre-Guidelines era, 32; managerial stock ownership, 19; prosecutors’ resources, 250; reputational sanctions/losses, 23; size of penalties, 25 Alliance Capital Management, 183 Anti-Injunction Act, 219 Aon Corporation, 52 Arlen, Jennifer: deterrence of corporate crime, 6; dollar value of criminal fines imposed on corporations, 31; institutional competence of regulatory agencies, 251; liability reduction for self-policing efforts, 87; responsibilities of regulatory agencies, 250; size of penalties, 25; structural reforms, 253 Arms Export Control Act, 158 Arthur Andersen, 46–48; collateral damage to, 2, 47, 227; fine sought, 47; government prosecution against, 39, 46–48; indictment of, 179; SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission), 179 Ashcroft, John, 4, 120, 212, 236 Attorneys General (AGs). See “state Attorneys General” and entries beginning “U.S. Attorney” Ayres, Ian, 88 Bank of America, 126 Barkow, Rachel E., 205, 251 Barnaba, Paul, 117 Beale, Sara Sun, 251 Bear Stearns, 112 Beccaria, Cesare, 15 Becker, Gary S., 15, 21, 34n1 Bentham, Jeremy, 15 Bernanke, Ben, 126 Bin Laden, Osama, 149n33 Biomet, Inc., 169 BLIPS, 167 Block, Michael K., 29 blue-sky laws, 204 “bonus culture,” 124 Brady v. Maryland, 159 Braithwaite, John, 27, 28, 88 Breeden, Richard, 160 bribing foreign officials, 168 Bristol-Myers Squibb: endowment of law school ethics program, 4, 41, 67, 252; financial disclosure, requirement for, 180; monitoring of, 4, 119 Index 264 | Index brokerage houses, 52–53 Bruenn, Christine, 166 Buell, Samuel: delicensing decisions by prosecutors, 42; pyramid of enforcement , 6–7; reputational sanctions/losses, 46; SEC (Securities Exchange Commission ), 249–250, 251 Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, 142 Bush administration, George W., 111–112, 114–115, 139–140 California, 145 California Circuit Prosecutor Project, 140–141 California Coastal Commission, 142 California Department of Occupational Safety and Health, 136–137 Canadian Imperial Bank, 180 Christie, Christopher J., 4, 41, 67 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 136, 149n31, 149n33 CIGNA, 183–184 Circuit Prosecutor Project (California), 140–141 civil liability, 77, 102 civil liability, reputational sanctions/losses in, 96 civil regulatory liability, corporate criminal liability compared to, 90–96 Clean Air Act, 120, 160, 256 Clinard, Marshall B., 28 Clinton, Bill, 149n33, 212 Cohen, Mark A., 19, 25, 29–31, 250 collateral damage: criminal fines imposed on corporations and, 85n42; from DPAs, 40, 41, 47, 51–52, 65; from indictment/ prosecution for corporate crime, 2, 5, 110 College Loan Code of Conduct, 4, 184–185 Collins & Aikman, 117 Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 124 compliance industry, 115–116, 117–118, 124, 125 compliance programs as a punishment: boilerplate for, 80; corporate criminal liability, 72; criminal fines imposed on corporations, 77, 92; in Delaware, 83n16; design of, 67–68; DOJ relief for noncompliance, 94; DOJ requirement for, 122; DPAs (deferred prosecution agreements), 66; effectiveness, 123; Holder Memo (“Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations”), 75; oversight of, 67–68, 78; prosecutor, role of, 77–78, 80, 123; SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission), 93–94; Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (“Guidelines”), 74, 157, 253–254; survival of the corporation, 123 Congress: corporate governance, reform of, 32; corporate monitors, 191; federal laws, intent of, 204; fines imposed on corporations, 73; prosecutors as regulators , 191; white-collar offenders, laws pertaining to, 31 controlled substances offenses, 225n66 convictions: DPAs compared to, 41–42; from guilty pleas, 178–179; indictments as greater threat than, 41; rate for corporate crime, 30; reputational sanctions/ losses, 179 corporate crime, 11–37; accountability for, 11; agency costs of, 19–20; benefits, 19–20, 85n30; causes, 14–28; collateral damage (see collateral damage); company-level decisions, outcome of, 17; conviction rate, 30; corporatecriminalvicariousliability doctrine,19;corporategovernance, 26;corporateinfluenceovercourseof investigations,115;decisionstobring criminalchargesagainstcorporations,14, 45–46,75,178,250–252;detectionrisk,16, 18,21,32,33;deterrenceof(seedeterrenceof corporatecrime);distinguishingfeatures, 11;DOJ’sapproachto,122–123;duration of,30;economicmodelof,32;effectof normson,27–28;effectivenessofDPAs/ NPAsincombating,254;employeesacting onbehalfofcorporations,15–16,17–18, 27–28,77;environmentaloffenses,27;EPA violations,26;factorsaffecting,33–34; [3.149.252.37] Project MUSE (2024...
