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[ 5 ] Tragedy on the Trail to Frenchtown, August 3–August 14 Word reached Hull on August 3 that a shipment of provisions for the army had reached the Rapids of the Maumee, only 30 miles from Frenchtown and the Raisin River. It was the most welcome news Hull had received in some time. Since July 9, the army had existed on the supplies that it had brought on the journey from Urbana, supplemented later by the food that McArthur had foraged during his journey to the Thames River. In the intervening three weeks the troops had used up over half their rations of flour and almost two-thirds of their salted meat.1 What remained could, with care, provide subsistence for another 20 days. It therefore was necessary to bring those supplies safely to Detroit. The fact that they were at the Rapids was a testament to Hull who, when he learned that the War Department had failed to make the necessary arrangements to feed his army, had privately contracted a Cincinnati merchant, John Piatt, to take charge of the matter. Piatt had begun gathering provisions as soon as the army had marched north from Urbana. By July 18 he had assembled 300 cattle and 70 packhorses, each of the latter carrying 200 pounds of flour, and forwarded them to Urbana. However, he did not believe that it was wise to send the provisions beyond Frenchtown through Indian country without an armed escort. A request to Governor Meigs resulted in the latter raising a company of 69 men, led by Captain Henry Brush, a Chillicothe attorney. Brush led the cattle and pack train out of Urbana on July 25, arriving at the Rapids on August 3, when he alerted Hull of his presence and asked for an escort from Detroit. To protect the supplies, he stored them in one of the blockhouses that Hull had constructed as the army marched north. He dared not move any further Tragedy on the Trail to Frenchtown 69 with so few men, having been alerted that the Indians were blockading the trail between the Raisin River and Detroit.2 Lucas made it a point to record in his journal that both Colonel McArthur and Cass had requested of Hull that he immediately dispatch a detachment of men to meet Brush and escort him to Detroit, but that Hull had repeatedly rejected their advice.3 Considering the importance that Hull repeatedly attached to acquiring the necessary supplies for the army throughout the campaign, Lucas’s claim about Hull on this date is open to question. Hull’s supply concerns were well founded. His supply base at Urbana was well beyond the distance over which an army could easily be provisioned . According to historian Kimball, the normal effective operational distance for packhorses between an army and its base of supplies was about 30 miles. The reason is that for packhorses to advance further, they also must carry their own forage. The longer the distance they are forced to travel, the more forage they consume, until a point is reached—about 45 miles—where they must carry more forage than supplies. Thus the transportation of foodstuffs by water to the location of an army camp was highly desirable, an option denied to Hull because the British controlled the river and lake traffic.4 On the day that the pack train had arrived at Frenchtown, Hull had convened a council of war to discuss whether the army should wait a few more days before attempting an attack on Malden, at which time the construction of the floating batteries for the heavy guns should have been completed. The immediate reaction of several of the officers, especially Cass, was that they should not wait but attack Malden immediately, even without heavy artillery. Most, however, were disposed to wait until the work on the floating batteries had been completed. Cass’s professed eagerness to go against Malden was surprising, inasmuch as on July 13 he written to Senator Worthington in Chillicothe, Ohio: “We are in high spirits, but I doubt if we are adequate to the reduction of Malden.”5 Captain Dyson of artillery skewed the debate. He claimed that even should they be able to transport the heavy guns in sight of Malden, they still were faced with another problem. The area around the fort was so marshy that they would need to be remounted on solid platforms if their fire were to have any effect.6 Colonel...

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