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[ 319 ] “Iran and the Arab-Israeli Conflict” was originally published in Middle East Journal 32, no. 4 (Autumn 1978): 413–28. iran and the arab-israeli conflict How does one try to explain Iran’s policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict? This is not a rhetorical question. The presumption that the “real nature ” of Iran’s behavior in respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict is enigmatic persists stubbornly. The so-called enigma is partly because of the paucity of information . Iran is hardly anxious to speak up on all the issues of the conflict under any circumstances. The rather cautious and often secretive approach of the Shah’s regime to the conflict is basically the result of a conscious and deliberate policy. It stems largely from a general desire to remain aloof from the quagmire of the age-old and intractable conflict between the Arabs and Israelis and to maintain a balancing posture between the two sides while pursuing Iran’s larger foreign-policy objectives. Another reason for the sense of mystery surrounding Iranian behavior is the fact that the few studies published so far bear indirectly or incompletely on the subject matter. They are useful mainly because they concentrate on the bilateral relations between Iran and Israel or on the implications of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 for Iranian foreign policy.1 As such they largely nibble at the edges of the fundamental concern of this essay, namely, Iran’s policy toward the ArabIsraeli conflict. The main purpose of this essay is to explore that policy in broad strokes as a means of aiding its understanding rather than evaluating its premises and results or prescribing a different course and direction for it, although one may hope that better understanding of its past and present will provide a clue to its future. The past and present policies that are found useful for the purpose of this analysis are those that stretch from the very birth of the state of Israel to the present time. The notion that the Iranian liberation of the Hebrews from Babylonian captivity by Cyrus the Great in 538 bc explains Irano-Israeli “amity,” or that the clash between the Shii and Jewish creeds and communities influences Irano-Israeli “antipathy,” today is largely a matter of speculation. Such basically cultural perspectives seem less useful as a means of policy explication by scholars than as a vehicle of policy rationalization by statesmen. The distinction is of fundamental importance because to confuse the two can steer the analyst away from the task of explication. As seen from the above [ 320 ] The Shah and Israel, Khatami and Bush examples, contemporary Iranian policymakers can avail themselves of the cultural perspective to rationalize favorable and unfavorable policies toward Israel depending on the circumstances. The same serious limitations of the cultural perspective as a means of explication applies to the attitudes and policies of Iran toward the Arab states. The Shii-Sunni doctrinal differences and ArabIranian cultural distinctions can be easily enlisted to rationalize a given unfavorable attitude or policy toward the Arab states, just as “Islamic solidarity” may be invoked to rationalize a favorable one. The key consideration for an understanding of Iran’s policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, this essay argues, is politico-strategic and concerns the improvement, or at least the preservation, of Iran’s regional environment within the broader context of world politics, which is perceived to be more conflictual than cooperative in nature. calculated ambivalence Those who would today characterize the Iranian policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict as “tilting” toward the Arab side might indeed tend to believe that Iran may be returning to a position somewhat similar to its original stance on the dispute within the United Nations in 1947. At that time, Iran favored the minority plan that advocated a federated state of Palestine composed of two autonomous states, one Jewish and one Arab. Iran, as well as the Arab states, endorsed this plan; it would satisfy the Arab demand for a single independent state with an Arab majority and a limited Jewish immigration. Iran also voted against the partition plan side by side with Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Iran’s attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1948, when the state of Israel was born, and 1950, when Iran accorded it de facto recognition, may be characterized as “calculated ambivalence.” The important question is why the Iranian...

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