In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

The buildup of fuel cell research formed part of a cresting wave of technoscientific positivism during the 10s, a widespread belief that advanced science and technology had an almost unlimited potential to reshape society for the better. For the industrially advanced countries, it had been a decade of relative peace, prosperity, and achievement in science and technology, particularly in the fields of biotechnology and, above all, electronics. There was a pervasive air of expectation , a mix of euphoria and apprehension at what the new century held in store, a feeling among observers in political, industry, and environmental circles that a saltation was imminent not only in technology but also in values. An important element of the millennial zeitgeist was rising awareness of the need for social and environmental justice, although the formulas for achieving this remained hotly disputed. This spirit penetrated even the most rarified corporate sanctums. After years as industry’s main bulwark against global warming science , the Global Climate Coalition crumbled. Du Pont was the first to defect in 17, followed by Royal Dutch/Shell in 18, Ford in 1, and DaimlerChrysler, General Motors, Texaco, and the Southern Company in 2000.1 In no field did high technology and environmental evangelism coalesce more seamlessly than in fuel cell automobility, a system planners in government and industry were increasingly associating with a hydrogen economy by the turn of the millennium. Alan C. Lloyd, appointed chair of the California Air Resources Board in February 1, was a noted enthusiast of hydrogen and hydrogen fuel cells. So was Amory Lovins, the influential physicist and advocate of sustainable energy technology. Popularizer of the notion of the “soft energy path” and cofounder of the Rocky Mountain Institute, a leading alternative energy think tank, Lovins paid little attention to fuel cells until the late 10s, when he began promoting the technology as the cleanest and most efficient 157 7 Electrochemical Millennium The way I think about it, we’re close today to switching to a hydrogen economy, so it won’t matter what mileage we get on cars now. I think that will happen soon. —Mark Rutecki, Hummer owner, November 22, 2003 VVVVVVVVVVV power source for his conceptual “Hypercar,” an electric automobile 60 percent lighter than conventional automobiles.2 No less a figure than Al Gore spoke glowingly of the fuel cell. In an interview with Rolling Stone in November 1, he remarked that the technology yielded only “clean water” in its waste stream. The hybrid gasoline-electric, said the presidential candidate, was merely an interim step on the road to the fuel cell automobile, some varieties of which would be available for sale “within the next few years.”3 The most important hydrogen advocates, however, were the federal government and the auto industry, above all General Motors. In the 2000s, the manufacturing giant would devote itself to hydrogen fuel cell power with all the zealotry of the recently converted. As in the carbonaceous fuel cell program, fuel cell–centric hydrogen futurism owed its rise to the ambitions of dissimilar groups with distinct and not always transparent interests in the technology. For the industrial gas industry, the apparent shift to the hydrogen fuel cell automobile was manna from heaven, promising massive growth and huge profits. For idealists, it was the realization of a dream. And automakers and their supporters in industry and government framed their motivations in utilitarian and moralistic terms. To be sure, interest in hydrogen and hydrogen fuel cell technology had arisen mainly because the project to electrochemically convert carbonaceous fuels had stalled. Yet it was convenient for auto manufacturers who had adamantly rejected all near-term alternatives to invest in a technology with utopian overtones but infrastructure requirements that rendered it a deep-future proposition. Although this point did not escape keen observers of energy and transportation technopolitics, it was often lost on futurists themselves, whose perspective of history, after all, was that of the longue durée. To them, it was a victory simply that mainstream manufacturers finally appeared to be taking hydrogen seriously. Indeed, industry’s enchantment with hydrogen and the hydrogen fuel cell was not all it appeared to be. One clue was the rapidity with which these technologies assumed the dominant place in green automobile discourse in the early 2000s. The accompanying dramaturgy featured a more calculated stagecraft than in the past, one that explicitly reinforced the federal government’s domestic and foreign policy goals. More than any other single device, the fuel...

Share