Water Wisdom: Preparing the Groundwork for Cooperative and Sustainable Water Management in the Middle East

Water Culture in Palestine

references Kantor, Shmuel, advisor to the Water Authority. 2007. Interview by author. Tel-Aviv, March 1. Keidar, Jackob, acting deputy director general for the Middle East, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2007. Interview by author. Jerusalem, February 27. Nagar, Baruch, West Bank director, Water Authority. 2007. Interview by author. Tel-Aviv, March 25. Raisner, Daniel, former head of International Affair, Israeli Defense Forces. 2007. Interview by author. June 3. Shamir, Uri, advisor to the Water Authority. 2007. Interview by author. Tel-Aviv, April 30. Tal, Shimon, water commissioner, 2001–2006. 2007. Interview by author. Hertzelia, February 16. Article 40 61 O Editors’ Summary Objectively, there are areas of clear progress that can be identified with the execution of Article 40 of the interim peace accord with its provisions for cooperation in water management. And yet there are also clearly disappointments on both sides. Palestinians have a difficult time translating “objective” indicators of progress associated with implementation with a general reality of day-to-day deterioration with which they are familiar. For example, while Palestinians today objectively have access to greater quantities of water than they did prior to the agreement, the effect on the pervasive scarcity is hardly recognizable. The 60 l/day allocation to average Palestinian families is only half that of Jordan’s, where water scarcity is considered a major problem. With a population that is still growing exponentially, along with a water delivery infrastructure that still suffers from chronic leakages, substantial numbers of Palestinians rely on cisterns and rain collection to meet their basic needs. Article 40 did little to change that. Israeli disappointment involves the broader breakdown of the peace process. From its perspective far more money went into Palestinian military hardware than into water infrastructure. Moreover, while copious quantities of international support were available following the interim agreement, Palestinians did not prioritize water resource development and sewage infrastructure. The most obvious inadequacy of Article 40 of the interim agreement is that while the provisions were intended to be an ephemeral stop on a much broader route that was to redefine the hydrological reality of the region, after almost 15 years the agreement functions as a permanent accord, for which it is poorly equipped. Hence, a clear definition of Palestinian water rights remains unresolved. Palestinians had little reason to anticipate Israeli goodwill in this area when there was constant enmity between the parties. Water is clearly one of the areas that Israel will want to use as a bargaining chip in the overall jockeying toward a final peace treaty. Therefore, Israel has not shown alacrity about making “concessions” up front. One of the failures of Article 40 involves the lack of meaningful progress in the establishment of upgraded Palestinian sewage systems. Despite considerable investment by donor nations in the Palestinian economy, only some 6%–7% of sewage is fully treated. Political instability offers much of the explanation for the lack of progress. Yet, all the same, the agreement has not served to help garner the necessary resources to transform the sewage profile and establish the hygienic infrastructure necessary for a modern, healthy land. Palestinians are miffed that Israel has unilaterally deducted funds from development funds for the Palestinians in order to cover the expenses of sewage treatment plants and to remunerate their expenses associated with transboundary discharge of pollution. 62 While the stamina of the Joint Water Committee, with its ability to maintain operations during the most tumultuous of times, is often held up as one of the greatest achievements of Article 40, the institution itself is the target of considerable criticism. Outside commentators have pointed to an inherent flaw of the JWC involving the absence of symmetry between the sides. The interim agreement requires Palestinians to run all water-related projects through the JWC. But no parallel expectations are made of Israel in its ventures in the water management field. This lack of symmetry is considered unfair, giving the JWC a reputation as an exploitive body that perpetuates Israeli domination. The JWC is also an excellent example of the gap in perceptions between the two sides. Because of the requirement for consensus in making its decisions, Palestinians for the most part see the committee as a continuation of Israeli domination , which serves to stymie independent hydrological initiatives and perpetuate Israeli control over their water resources. They argue that important sewage projects were delayed because one Israeli representative had reservations...