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37 O Editors’ Summary There appears to be little substantive differences between Israeli and Palestinian assessments of available water resources and their condition. For the most part, the sides are no longer arguing about facts or data, but rather water rights, allocation, and policy. There are, of course, clear objective disparities in the hydrological circumstances of the two populations which inform each party’s positions. The average per capita consumption of 50 l/day in the West Bank and the 13 l/day per capita (suitable for drinking purposes) in Gaza place constant pressure on the stability and socioeconomic conditions of a future Palestinian state. Without a sufficient and safe supply of water, Palestinians believe that it will be difficult to ensure a sustainable future. Especially during a period of consecutive drought years, Israel, particularly its agricultural sector, also has legitimate concerns about hydrological sustainability. Israel’s economy and political interests are, however, far less vulnerable to present and projected levels of water scarcity. Moreover, its negotiators have never denied the importance for Israel of ensuring that a Palestinian state not be a thirsty one, or ensuring that it is a country with an advanced sanitary infrastructure . Hence, reaching a future agreement in the water realm need not involve the traditional “zero-sum game” approaches that characterized past negotiations. The Palestinians perceive the quantities of water allocated to them as a core political issue in the final status negotiations. Because of past sensitivities and the historic dynamics of occupation, they prefer to view the issue in terms of “rights.” Indeed, Palestinians have always held that their water rights should extend to their “indigenous and shared groundwater aquifers” as well as to surface waters that run through their jurisdiction, in particular, the Jordan River. It should, however, be emphasized that never have the Palestinians demanded “equal” quantities of water—but rather only what they believe to be their fair share. While Palestinians would like water quantity issues resolved before moving on to the problems of sustainable management, development, and planning to protect water quality, it is likely that they will agree that the two topics be considered in tandem. Israel has always seen the resolution of conflict over water as part of a broader package of peace issues. Given the new affordability of desalinated water and the relatively modest role of agriculture in Israel’s economy, it is likely to be one of the core issues about which it will be easier for Israel to be flexible. At the same time, Israel realizes that coordinated efforts to protect water resources are critical for a long-term strategy. Just as the provisions regulating water were among the most detailed and ambitious of the interim agreements between the two parties, a future agreement from Israel’s perspective should go far beyond allocations accounting and include management, policy, standards, and enforcement. Palestinians insist that water rights be resolved according to principles of international law, which they believe will guarantee them sufficient quantities and the sovereignty to utilize and control their water resources. The basic axiom of international water law, though, is rather vague, requiring only that all sides receive a reasonable and equitable share. This should not be deemed problematic as the principle is sufficiently amorphous and given to sufficiently flexible interpretations to allow Israel to agree to have it as a basis for resolving the existing disputes. To be sure, the two sides do not agree about the legality of past water developments for Israeli settlements, nor to the legitimacy of Israel’s “historic rights” to water resources that originate in the West Bank. Yet, resolving the clashing interpretations of international legal principles ultimately belongs to the tit-for-tat bickering of the past. Such theoretical controversies should not stand in the way of a pragmatic approach that can reach accommodation about water rights, water distribution , management, and common efforts to improve water quality. There are some differences in the data that the two sides will bring to the table, particularly in the area of potential aquifer recharge and present and future needs. It is possible that climate change and dwindling precipitation are at the heart of the gap in perceptions. Such disparities can be clarified and resolved either through joint scientific commissions or the utilization of third-party arbiters. Ultimately, these differences are not excessive, and were any of the remaining disagreements about available water resources to be quantified, the volume probably would...

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