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90 Chapter 6 George Washington Carver, Oliver Golden, and the Soviet Experiment  Russia is the only country in the world today, that gives equall [sic] chances to black and white alike.1 —Oliver Golden (1930) “Iwonder if you would consider the following proposition: I have proposed to organize a group of Negro specialists who have had a theoretical and practical training in the production of cotton, to be sent to the Soviet Union,” wrote Oliver Golden to his former teacher, George Washington Carver. “This group is to be indorsed [sic] by you [and if] it meets with your approval, I shall also arrange a tour for you to the Soviet Union to demonstrate your findings in the field of agriculture. The expenses of this tour will be taken care of.”2 Carver was intrigued; he liked challenges. He answered, “Thank you for your splendid letter which has reached me, and I have looked it over quite carefully . . . . I shall be interested in knowing the further plans . . . [and] shall endeavor to do the best I can in this important matter.”3 Thus, on December 12, 1930, began a unique partnership: an aging scientist and a prescient former student , pooling their resources to send skilled blacks to help modernize the Soviet economy. Golden was part of a vast network of people working on behalf of the Comintern to recruit technically skilled workers for the Soviet Union. Stalin’s five-year plan called for speeding up the country’s economic recovery, and no expense was being spared. Now, the attention was being directed to the expansion of the country’s cotton industry in Soviet Central Asia. Golden, who had done political studies in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, wanted Carver to serve as a senior technical adviser to the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture and to bring some his most talented students with him. “It is absolutely necessary that you go on a tour of Russia. . . . Your going to the U.S.S.R., and the successes of these men will give Tuskegee an international character.”4 Carver and Tuskegee had already achieved that international character with Carver, Golden, and the Soviet Experiment 91 projects in Africa, Japan, and India, but both men knew the Soviet program could be another coup for this historically black institution. The Agricultural versus the Industrial Sector Two currents of opinion were shaping the Soviet five-year plans toward the end of the 1920s. One held that, as a traditionally agrarian country, the expansion of the agricultural sector was of primary importance. The other held that the agrarian sector was, in fact, the weaker link to the country’s future—if it was to compete with industrialized nations. Instead, special attention should be directed to shoring up the industrial base first. Nicholay Bukharin, close confidant and heir-apparent to Lenin, championed agriculture. But, Stalin, who displaced Bukharin after Lenin’s death, opted to emphasize industry.5 Bukharin’s writing had shaped much of the party line from 1925 through 1927, but, by late 1928 and early 1929, he and his supporters (the Bukharists) had lost much of their popular and political support. Bukharin was not averse to the idea of rapid industrialization, but he was adamant that it would fail without the development of the agricultural sector.6 To his thinking, by helping the peasants rebuild their base, the whole country—not just the urban areas—would benefit. Stalin, however, fascinated with the developments in Europe and the United States, wanted to push industrialization, and his policies were the ones implemented. Thus, the government focused on industrialization in the beginning and only later turned to building the agricultural base. Even then, the quest was not for simple agricultural improvements but for an industrial template for the redevelopment. In other words, agricultural development was to proceed with centralized planning and forced collectivization. But the industrial model did not prove so effective for the agricultural sector, as the Soviets were frequently confronted by recalcitrant peasants and slow-downs. As Roy Medvedev noted, “Collectivization was supposedly designed to achieve a rapid increase in total agricultural output [but the] gross agricultural output declined through the first five-year plan.”7 Golden reasoned that because the Soviets were willing to import expertise for their industrial development, they would be equally interested in having agricultural specialists. Thus, he proposed that teams of black specialists be assembled and that, as a bonus, he might be able to attract the famous Carver to lead them. He...

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