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Chpater 8: A Win-Some Lose-All Game: Social Differentiation and Politics of Groundwater Markets in North Gujarat
- Rutgers University Press
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172 1 bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb 8 A Win-Some Lose-All Game Social Differentiation and Politics of Groundwater Markets in North Gujarat ANJAL PRAKASH VISHWA BALLABH Agriculture in India has gone through enormous changes since the Green Revolution. Based on external inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, high-yielding variety seeds (HYVs) and irrigation, Green Revolution technology became popular in many states of India. Large surface irrigation schemes were initiated in the sixties, and subsidy for HYVs and fertilizers was provided with the aim of making India self-sufficient in food production. However, the new technology also demanded more control over irrigation, which canal systems were unable to provide. Well irrigation was seen as an alternative to the bureaucratically controlled canal systems and this perception led to increased groundwater irrigation in many locations. Today, groundwater accounts for more than percent of total irrigation in India. As a result of intensive groundwater-based farming, problems of large-scale overdevelopment of aquifers have emerged. Gujarat, a western state of India, is a case in point. In this state, groundwater supports more than percent of total irrigation requirements. Due to this increased dependence on groundwater for irrigation purposes, many parts of Gujarat have changed from water-abundant areas into waterscarce areas in only four decades. Groundwater overdraft, coupled with increasing scarcity and pollution of surface water supplies, has resulted in groundwater “mining” in many parts of Gujarat. As a consequence, an increasing number of areas are now categorized as overexploited. The latest figures released by the government show that, whereas in percent of the subdistricts were under the “white,” or safely exploited, category, this has decreased to about percent in .1 The number of overexploited subdistricts has increased from just one in to thirty-one in . Salinity intrusion into the groundwater is another problem caused by excessive withdrawal of groundwater, especially in areas close to the seashore or in marshy areas like Kutch and coastal Saurashtra. A WIN-SOME LOSE-ALL GAME 173 The number of subdistricts affected by salinity has increased from one in to seven in . In , only percent of the subdistricts in Gujarat have groundwater that is considered safe (Hirway ). These figures show an extremely grim picture of groundwater utilization and its development in Gujarat. Along with water scarcity, Gujarat has also experienced a spurt in water markets. These markets developed mostly in alluvial regions of central and north Gujarat that were suitable for sinking deep tube wells. The emergence of water markets has given rise to debates over their nature and way of functioning . A group of academics and policy makers advocate the need for dense and competitive markets on the grounds of efficiency, transaction costs, accessibility , and equity in resource distribution. Using the concept of property rights, they argue that tradable rights to groundwater will increase the efficiency of water use (see Chambers et al. ; Kolavalli and Chicoine ; Rosegrant and Binswanger ; Shah ; Tsur and Dinar ). Another group opposes these ideas, arguing that water markets, dominated by resource-rich upper-caste farmers, lead to the violation of rights of poor and marginalized farmers.2 They argue that transactions in groundwater markets are based on the politics of powerful well owners, and therefore reflect the economic and class relationships that are detrimental to the poor and marginalized sections of the village population (see Janakarajan , ; Saleth a; Shah and Ballabh ; Singh ). Whether the argument is in favor of or against water markets, it is clear that the functioning of groundwater markets is very much situationdependent (Dubash ). Through an intensive village case study in Mehsana District in Gujarat (see figure .), the present chapter tries to capture some of the key issues in the debate. It shows how a class of people flourished even in a situation of extreme water scarcity. These people are resourceful farmers who invested in deep tube wells and hence could access and sell surplus water. Small and marginal farmers lost the race of chasing the water table and became buyers of water. The groundwater markets flourished in the nineties, thus increasing access to irrigation for the people. However, control over water is largely concentrated in the hands of sellers. Further, it also created differential rights over groundwater for buyers and sellers. In India, access to groundwater is directly linked with land rights. However, in its attempts to regulate groundwater extraction, the government responded by controlling institutional finance, spacing, licensing, and electricity pricing rather than directly striving for an equitable system of land and water rights. These measures could not stand up...
