Human Action in Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham

5. Indifferent, Good, and Meritorious Acts

185 5 Indifferent, Good, and Meritorious Acts Medieval discussions of how acts are characterized are ultimately ordered to considerations about how such acts should be evaluated. Thomas, Scotus, and Ockham not only have different ways of understanding an act’s object and circumstances, but they also disagree about the different kinds of goodness and badness indicated by these features. The three kinds of goodness that belong to acts are natural goodness, moral goodness, and supernatural merit. The distinction between natural goodness and the other two kinds of goodness is a distinction between the goodness of acts in general and the goodness that belongs to distinctively human acts. An act has natural goodness because it is a natural act, whereas it has the other kinds of goodness insofar as the distinctively human act corresponds to right reason. In chapter 4, we have seen that Thomas and Scotus distinguish between (1) the act’s natural species, (2) the interior act, and (3) the exterior act. Different kinds of acts are good in different ways. An act’s natural species is the basis of its natural goodness. Rendering the marriage debt and adultery can both belong to the same natural species, namely human reproduction. The act is naturally good on account of the act’s being, or more particularly in the way in the act attains its natural end, which is the production of a healthy child. In 186 Indifferent, Good, and Meritorious Acts contrast, both interior and exterior acts can have moral goodness and an additional goodness that is merit. Natural goodness is “natural” in the way that the natural is distinct from the rational. Moral goodness can be described as a different kind of natural goodness, if by “natural” we do not mean “natural” as distinct from “rational,” but instead as distinct from what God out of his own graciousness adds to nature. The goodness of merit is natural in neither way. An act is meritorious insofar as it somehow directs or is directed to a supernatural reward or demeritorious insofar as God will punish it and it earns the weakening or withdrawal of God’s favor and gifts. Merit and demerit do not consist in an act’s mere moral goodness or badness, although, at least in the order that God has established , moral goodness is a necessary condition for merit. First, we will consider the distinction between the kinds of acts to which goodness can accrue, namely the act in its natural species, the interior act, and the exterior act. In particular, there is disagreement over the way in which the exterior act’s moral worth and merit can be connected with that of the interior act. Second, we will examine more narrowly moral goodness and badness, as well as the question of whether acts can be morally indifferent. Third, we will consider the way in which moral goodness is related to merit, and whether agents who have charity can perform morally good acts that are indifferent to merit. The first point is especially connected to the question of how the goodness of free human acts is connected with natural inclination . All three points reflect disagreements over the explanatory power of the human and even divine will, and over how acts are caused. Natural and Moral Goodness Medieval thinkers thought successful murder deserves a worse punishment than merely attempted murder. Similarly, martyrdom merits a special reward that the mere readiness to be martyred does not. They agree that the completion of an act affects the worth of the whole act, although they differ in their explanations of how it does.1 Debates over 1. Osborne, “Interior and Exterior Acts,” 111–22. 187 Indifferent, Good, and Meritorious Acts the difference between mere choice and an act’s completion occur in discussions over the connection between the interior and the exterior act. There is disagreement both over whether the exterior act has its own moral worth and also over what the exterior act is. The first disagreement is partially based on the second disagreement. What is the exterior act? In chapter 4, we have seen that for Thomas the exterior act has its own object, which can also be considered as the act’s matter, or as the proximate end and object of the interior act. The interior and exterior act are distinct in their natural species, although they form together one human act.2 The interior act belongs...