Political Philosophy and Revelation

6. Why Political Philosophy Is Not a Natural Science

57 6. Why Political Philosophy Is Not a Natural Science Philosophy assigns the distinctive ends of the special sciences in the sense that it determines speculatively the distinctive object of each, and what constitutes their specific unity and differentiation from the rest. And so doing it assigns the order in which they stand one to another. Jacques Maritain “Scientific” political science is in fact incompatible with political philosophy. The useful work done by the men called political scientists is independent of any aspiration towards “scientific” political science. It consists of careful and judicious collections and analyses of politically relevant data.... Political philosophy is the attempt to understand the nature of political things.  Leo Strauss He who endeavors to reflect on the totality of world and existence, that is, to philosophize , sets foot on a path that in this life will never come to an end. Josef Pieper I • Political science departments in universities are variously also called “government,” “politics,” or, more dubiously, “social science” departments . Unlike other university departments such as history, English, or physics, political science has traditionally maintained a subsection within its general sphere of interest devoted to “theory” or “political philosophy .” This division brings up the question: “Why is not the philosophAn earlier version of this chapter was presented at the American Maritain Association Conference, Aquinas College, Nashville, Tennessee, November 3, 2006. Epigraphs are from Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy, trans. E. I. Watkin (London: Sheed & Ward, 1946), 85; Leo Strauss, “What Is Political Philosophy?” in What Is Political Philosophy and Other Studies (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), 14; Josef Pieper, In Defense of Philosophy, trans. L. Krauth (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992 [1966]), 85. 58   Something or Other ic consideration of politics located in the philosophy department?” Or perhaps we could put it another way: “Even though they sometimes list courses that are clearly related to political philosophy, are contemporary philosophy departments in fact ‘philosophic’ enough to deal philosophically with political things?” Do they know a philosophy that in fact can handle political things? Is there a problem here of more depth than at first meets the eye? “Are political philosophy subsections, as those in the field sometimes suspect, themselves more philosophic than philosophy departments?” Or to turn the question around again, “Does the proper consideration of political science itself imply a philosophy that is not easily found in philosophy departments or, even less likely, in science departments?” To answer such questions, we need to know both what political things are andwhat“philosophy”mostaccuratelyexplainstouswhattheyare.Not all philosophies allow us to reach what is. Indeed, not a few philosophies are designed precisely to prevent us from reaching the reality that is. In a basic sense, the whole issue of “What is modernity?” is the concern of many contemporary political philosophers and deals with this question. Aristotle himself already provided the basis of these wonderments when he remarked that if man were the highest being in the universe, politics would be the highest science (1142a20–22).1 The implications of this observation still provide the single most important insight for the understanding of both philosophy and political philosophy with their intimate relation to each other. Neither is safe without the other. If metaphysics, first philosophy, is the highest science, the knowledge of being as being, of what is, then political things, whatever they are, already fall within, not above or outside, the sphere of the higher science. But if politics were itself the highest science, which is the case when man is held to be the highest being, what follows? It is this consequence of “What follows?” that I wish to touch upon here. Aristotle told us that the theoretic sciences looked to those things that“couldnotbeotherwise”(1139a6–13).Politicalscience,ontheother hand, like ethics, was a “practical science.” Its proper object contained 1. See Charles N. R. McCoy, The Structure of Political Thought (New York: McGrawHill , 1963), 29–72. Political Science 59 things that also “could be otherwise.” That is, political things, though they need to be some way, need not, as such, be this way or that way. Aristotle calls politics the highest of the practical sciences (1142a23– 28). Thus, it evidently has its own particular nobility and arena, distinct from other disciplines but not unrelated to them. Thus, we should not expect more certitude in a discipline, like politics , than its variable subject matter can yield (1094b13–16). Philosophy , at its very core, intends...