Ethics, Nationalism, and Just War: Medieval and Contemporary Perspectives

10. U.N.-Authorized Interventions: A Slippery Slope of Forcible Interference?

10 U.N.-Authorized Interventions A Slippery Slope of Forcible Interference? anne julie semb The philosophical tradition of just war has concentrated on two questions. First, what, if any, are the legitimate reasons for engaging in war (ius ad bellum)? Second, what is it justifiable to do, against whom, when fighting a war (ius in bello)? The topic of this chapter, which is the changed scope of the principle of nonintervention, is rooted in the tradition of ius ad bellum . Whereas nonintervention was, for much of the twentieth century and going further back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, honored as the most appropriate principle for the regulation of interstate relations, a number of specific concerns were referred to as justifications for interventions in the 1990s.1 The principle of nonintervention was challenged not only with reference to human rights but also with reference to considerations concerning de facto statehood as well as democratic governance . This suggests that the scope of the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states went through important modifications in the aftermath of the end of the cold war. The scope for justified resort to force in particular circumstances expanded accordingly. The backdrop of my essay is my interest in the principle of noninter- ∏ 218 1. In this essay the concept of intervention will be narrowly defined. Intervention will be understood to mean the conscious use of military force for the purpose of compelling another government to act or refrain from acting in a certain manner. vention and the large-scale changes with regard to interventions that took place within the Security Council over the last decade. The dramatic events of September 11, 2001, in the United States no doubt affected foreign policy—as well as scholarly agendas—but in no way resolved the question of the proper scope of the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states and the entire issue of the range of legitimate exceptions to the general rule of nonuse of force between states. In my opinion, this is a testimony to the continued relevance of the question posed. This chapter has a twofold aim. First, I present the criteria for justified interventions that developed during the 1990s. Second, I discuss whether this softening of the principle of nonintervention implies that the U.N. embarked on a slippery slope of forcible interference. One reason for resisting a softening of the principle of nonintervention is that once one allows for interventions for some normatively defensible purposes, it may prove difficult to establish barriers against a further softening of this principle . This may eventually have intolerable consequences. The U.N. Security Council practice of authorizing interventions suggests that states may lose their claim to protection under the principle of nonintervention if (1) the state engages in systematic human rights violations, (2) it is incapable of protecting human rights due to the breakdown of state authority , or (3) the government in power is unlawfully constituted. When these conditions have been present, the Security Council has considered the situation a “threat to the peace” and authorized enforcement measures under chapter VII. I will start by examining the foundation and scope of the traditional principle of nonintervention. Then I will describe the ways in which a number of U.N.-authorized interventions in the 1990s deviate from that principle. Thereafter I will discuss the dangers of the so-called slippery slope. The slippery slope argument is frequently invoked when a practice is changed so as to allow something rather than nothing. In this connection , I will argue that the conception of “threat to the peace” expanded considerably in the 1990s. I will, in light of this, discuss the danger that wider interpretations of this conception further softens the principle of nonintervention. Then I will discuss a further danger: that ideas of what constitutes a “threat to the peace” will be subject to other interpretations . It would seem that a wide range of situations can be termed U.N.-Authorized Interventions 219 such a threat. It would seem, then, that it is difficult to establish stopping points along the slippery slope by suggesting substantial criteria for when force may legitimately be used. This, however, does not necessarily mean that it is impossible to get off the slippery slope once on it. The relevant actors’ perceptions of what can be achieved by the use of armed force, weighed against the...