Democracy and the Ethical Life: A Philosophy of Politics and Community (Second Edition, Expanded)

XIII. The Common Good and History

The Common Good and History XIII This book has sought to determine to what extent and in what form democracy is compatible with the ethical imperative of human existence. In arguing for a fundamental distinction between constitutional and plebiscitary democracy and demonstrating the ethical deficiency of the latter, it has set forth a general understanding of the way in which the transcendent moral order affects politics. To the extent that politics is influenced by ethical conscience, it helps to build up the common good, a quality of life to which one may also refer, stressing its more intimate form, as community. The meaning of the common good, as related to the circumstances of democracy, can be clarified by addressing some possible objections to the previous argument. Four closely related lines of reasoning may be restated and extended. First, it is a source of possible puzzlement or unease that ethical universality has not been identified with specific principles of right. What is ultimately normative in the ethical life is not a form of rationality but a special quality of will. Ethical good does not result from imitating a preexisting intellectual model. The ethical authority to which man finally defers is a higher purposiveness within practical experience. This higher will is a power within the particular person, but it is not under the control of the individual in the sense that 206 THE COMMON GOOD AND HISTORY 207 he can arbitrarily decree what is good. Still, the ethical purpose of the higher will must be realized in the particular circumstances of those who act under its authority. Although reason is indispensable to this effort, it is misguided to look for "principles" of conduct that are valid at all times and in all places. The ethical life does need norms to help orient human action to its higher end, but all specific rules of guidance are transcended by the ethical needs of actual situations. Advancing the common good in politics is not a matter of formulating an ethical master plan and implementing it by central direction . Discerning opportunities for good is not a monopoly of singularly enlightened individuals or groups. Laws and other forms of direction are necessary to the good society, but even the most comprehensive and best-laid plans are defied by the complexity and variability of life. Second, it will raise questions that the understanding of ethical universality here propounded does not contrast the particular interests of individuals, groups and associations with a disinterested common good. It is contended instead that all of human existence, including the ethical life, is a pursuit of interests. Disinterested life is a contradiction in terms. So is politics without partisanship. Without a readiness to contend with competing interests, nothing can be achieved. A purpose not carried by the energy of will does not belong to the world of action. Ethical universality can be advanced only through the particular aspirations of ethically interested individuals and groups who assert their will against contrary interests. Third, this book argues that no society can expect to derive the order it needs solely or primarily from the ethical aspirations of its citizens. Since the moral flaws of human nature are considerable and inescapable, personal and social order must be derived in part from man's lower desires. This is pos- 208 DEMOCRACY AND THE ETHICAL LIFE sible because selfishness contains within itself a great capacity for self-control, discipline being in the long run more conducive to its interests than a lack thereof. An ethically very important goal of constitutional arrangements is to make selfishness less rash and blatant, to give it reasons to be more enlightened. Out of concern for its own long-term advantage, selfishness may, under institutional inducements, begin to accommodate other interests in society, and among them interests of ethical inspiration. To that extent, enlightened selfishness is bent, however modestly, to the purposes of the ethical life. It may even offer some unintended support for the common good in the ethical sense. Fourth, ethics as here understood does not indulge in wishful thinking. It does not entertain the possibility of eradicating egotism from human life, especially not from politics. The ethical life must seek its opportunities in an often inhospitable environment. It must recognize its own limited power and adjust its means to the stubborn obstacles it faces. The ethical spirit of constitutionalism can be said to accept interests at odds with the...