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Chapter 7 Two Arguments against Euthanasia Brendan Sweetman In addition to abortion, the subject of euthanasia is one of the most discussed and controversial moral topics in contemporary American society. At present, the practice is legal in only one state, Oregon, following passage of that state’s Death with Dignity Act in 1997, and its subsequent survival of several court challenges.1 But the issue has appeared on the ballot in several other states over the past decade or so, where it has always been defeated. It is almost certain that it will be on the ballot in those same states and in other states in the not too distant future. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that many citizens will be called upon to vote on the issue of euthanasia in the next decade. It is therefore imperative to consider the moral and legal issues surrounding the topic. I will argue that euthanasia is immoral, and so should be illegal. Before elaborating my argument for this conclusion, I wish to be clear about what I mean by the term “euthanasia.” It will also be helpful to distinguish my understanding of the term from other possible uses of the term, and also to note the relationship between my use of the term and other terms that are germane to the debate. By “euthanasia,” I am referring to the intentional killing of a patient with the aim of bringing an end to that person’s suffering. I would like to use the term broadly to include cases where euthanasia is requested 173 I wish to thank Edward Furton and Doug Geivett for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. by the patient (voluntary euthanasia), and cases where it is not requested by the patient (involuntary euthanasia). I am also including in this understanding of the term cases more recently described as “physician-assisted suicide”; my argument makes no distinction between whether a patient commits suicide himself for the purposes of ending suffering, or whether the patient is assisted in killing himself by medical personnel, or whether medical personnel fully carry out the act with no assistance from the patient. I do not deny that differences between these cases may have moral significance, but they will not be significant for our argument because we are mainly interested in the general question of whether suicide in end-of-life cases is moral. Two other important points are worth emphasizing before we move on to the main argument. First, I do not think that there is a morally significant distinction between active and passive euthanasia; since active euthanasia is wrong, so is passive euthanasia.2 The term active euthanasia describes cases where there is an act of commission—where the doctor actively kills the patient, say, by administering a lethal injection that directly brings about death, whereas passive euthanasia describes cases where there is an act of omission—where the doctor removes a treatment, say, by switching off a life-support machine or ending a drug treatment, and allowing the patient to die. Some argue that the moral difference between these two forms of euthanasia is that, depending on the type of treatment being removed or ended, passive euthanasia lets nature take its course in the sense that the patient might not die, whereas active euthanasia actively involves intervention in the course of nature to insure that death does take place. In some cases—for example, in switching off a machine—it is often argued that we are letting nature take its course, and sometimes the patient does not die. However, passive euthanasia is just as wrong as active euthanasia because the intention of the doctor is to kill the patient (this is also the intention of the patient who requests euthanasia). If this is the doctor’s intention, then he switches off the machine to bring about the patient’s death, and if the patient lives, nature thwarts his intention. However, second, I fully accept the distinction that is sometimes made in the debate on euthanasia between extraordinary and ordinary means. This distinction was initially based on the insight that it is not morally necessary for medical personnel to use extraordinary means to keep a person alive, but it is morally necessary to use ordinary means to keep a person alive.3 But with the increasing advances in technology in the field of medicine, 174 brendan s weetman [3.138.116.20] Project MUSE (2024-04-19 12...

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