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12. Distinction, Judgment, and Discipline
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12 Distinction, Judgment, and Discipline MARIAM THALOS Philosophers intheanalytictraditioninsistuponadistinctionbetween knowledgeandfact,normallyasfollows:knowledgeissomething heldbyasubjectofsomesort,andfactis—well,itstandsonitsownfeet, withoutafact-finde ,subject,or“obser ver”tothankforitsexistence. Thusfactsowenoontologicaldebttosecondpartieswhosemovements bringabouttheexistenceoffacts.Whilstknowledgecomesoutasfun damentally arelation—onethatholdsbetweenaknowerandanobject ofknowledge.So,firstintimewe(inthe est)distinguish—wesaythat thisisnotthat:“knowledgeisnotmerefact.”T odistinguishis,f rstof all,tomakeastatementofnonidentity ,andthereby toinviteotherstoseetwothings,wherebeforethey might—for wantofreflectionortrainingorsom otherroutetoinsight—haveseenonlyone. Adistinctionsuggestsoneofthreerelationsbetween thetermsofthedistinction(seeFigure12.1): (1)nooverlap—asituationinwhichthecategories are disjoint;( 2) simpleoverlap—asituationin which theintersectionbetweenthecategoriesis smallerthaneitheroftheoverlappingcategories;or (3)subsumption—asituationinwhichonecategory is relatedtotheotherasgenustospecies.Atthe sametime,then,adistinctionpromptsthefurther questionofjusthowthe“distinguands”differ ,since thedistinctionclaimsthatthetermsnamenonidentical things.Adistinctionisadevicethatprompts immediatelyforadefinition.Itisamoveintheen terpriseforanalysisthatcallsimmediatelyforanallied move.(Thissuggeststhatthereareimpulsesin judgment towardmaximalsystematicity—towarda maximalsystemofinterlockingorbridgingconnec tions .) 185 figure 12.1 no overlap overlap subsumption Thedistinctionbetweenfactandknowledgeisthefoundationfor thedivision,inclassicalandAnglo-Americanphilosophy ,betweenthe disciplines ofepistemology, ontheonehand,andthedisciplineof metaphysics,ontheother .Thusthedistinctionfoundsadivisionbetween twophilosophicalenterprises,whileatthesametimeprompting thequestionofwhether,andtowhatextent,theyoverla p.(Thisisthe normalwayoffoundingdisciplines.)AndthestandardAnglo-American wayofarticulatingthedefinitio thatgoesalongwiththedistinctionisto saythatmetaphysicsisconcernedwithhowthingsstandintheworld, whileepistemologyisconcernedwithhowsubjectsgettobemindfulof these standings-in-the-world-of-things.Thisarticulationofthedifference betweenfactandknowledgeprivilegesthefactovertheknowledge ofit:itputsthefact(andhencemetaphysics)intheindependent positionanddefinesknowledge(andhenceepistemology)intermso it.Thiswayofproceedinginanalyticalphilosophycausestwodistinct problems. Thefirstisthatitsuggests,quitebaselessl ,thatadef nitionoranalysis canbefound—andindeedshouldbesought—ofthedependent termofthedistinctionintermsoftheindependentone(amongother things,tobesure).Thismight,forallweknow ,bejustfalse.Bertrand Russellbegins,inthe 1912 ProblemsofPhilosophy, withadistinctionbetween factandknowledgeinthespiritoutlinedabove,adding:“The questionastowhatwemeanbytruthandfalsehood. l.l.isofmuchless interestthanthequestionastohowwecanknowwhatistrueandwhat is false.”1 Then, immediately, he—nolesshandilythan,forexample, EdmundGettier,andconsiderablyearlier—generatestheproblemof theanalysisofknowledgeasfollows.First,hewondershowknowledge mightberelatedtothefactitpurportstoknow .Isknowledgemerely truebelief? IfamanbelievesthatthelatePrimeMinister’ snamebeginswiththeletterB, hebelieveswhatistrue,sincethelatePrimeMinisterwasSirHenr yCampbell Bannerman.Butifhebelieves[wecanadd:forgoodreason]thatMr .Balfour wasthelatePrimeMinister ,hewillstillbelievethatthelatePrimeMinister’ s name beganwiththeletterB,yetthisbelief,thoughtrue,wouldnotbe thoughttoconstituteknowledge. l.l.l.Thusitisclearthatatruebeliefisnot knowledge,whenitisderivedfromafalsebelief[wecanadd:howeverwelljus tified ] 2 Sothefirstproblemcausedbytheroutinewayofdistinguishingbe tweenfactandknowledge...