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12 Distinction, Judgment, and Discipline MARIAM THALOS Philosophers฀ in฀the฀analytic฀tradition฀insist฀upon฀a฀distinction฀between ฀knowledge฀and฀fact,฀normally฀as฀follows:฀knowledge฀is฀something held฀by฀a฀subject฀of฀some฀sort,฀and฀fact฀is—well,฀it฀stands฀on฀its฀own฀feet, without฀a฀fact-finde ,฀subject,฀or฀“obser ver”฀to฀thank฀for฀its฀existence. Thus฀facts฀owe฀no฀ontological฀debt฀to฀second฀parties฀whose฀movements bring฀about฀the฀existence฀of฀facts.฀Whilst฀knowledge฀comes฀out฀as฀fun damentally ฀a฀relation—one฀that฀holds฀between฀a฀knower฀and฀an฀object of฀knowledge.฀So,฀first฀in฀time฀we฀(in฀the฀ est)฀distinguish—we฀say฀that this฀is฀not฀that:฀“knowledge฀is฀not฀mere฀fact.”฀T o฀distinguish฀is,฀f rst฀of all,฀to฀make฀a฀statement฀of฀nonidentity ,฀and฀thereby to฀invite฀others฀to฀see฀two฀things,฀where฀before฀they might—for฀ want฀of฀reflection฀or฀training฀or฀som other฀route฀to฀insight—have฀seen฀only฀one. A฀distinction฀suggests฀one฀of฀three฀relations฀between ฀the฀terms฀of฀the฀distinction฀(see฀Figure฀12.1): (1)฀no฀overlap—a฀situation฀in฀which฀the฀categories are฀ disjoint;฀( 2)฀ simple฀overlap—a฀situation฀in which฀ the฀intersection฀between฀the฀categories฀is smaller฀than฀either฀of฀the฀overlapping฀categories;฀or (3)฀subsumption—a฀situation฀in฀which฀one฀category is฀ related฀to฀the฀other฀as฀genus฀to฀species.฀At฀the same฀time,฀then,฀a฀distinction฀prompts฀the฀further question฀of฀just฀how฀the฀“distinguands”฀differ ,฀since the฀distinction฀claims฀that฀the฀terms฀name฀nonidentical ฀ things.฀A฀distinction฀is฀a฀device฀that฀prompts immediately฀for฀a฀definition.฀It฀is฀a฀move฀in฀the฀en terprise฀for฀analysis฀that฀calls฀immediately฀for฀an฀allied ฀move.฀(This฀suggests฀that฀there฀are฀impulses฀in judgment฀ toward฀maximal฀systematicity—toward฀a maximal฀system฀of฀interlocking฀or฀bridging฀connec tions .) 185 figure 12.1 no overlap overlap subsumption The฀distinction฀between฀fact฀and฀knowledge฀is฀the฀foundation฀for the฀division,฀in฀classical฀and฀Anglo-American฀philosophy ,฀between฀the disciplines฀ of฀epistemology,฀ on฀the฀one฀hand,฀and฀the฀discipline฀of metaphysics,฀on฀the฀other .฀Thus฀the฀distinction฀founds฀a฀division฀between ฀two฀philosophical฀enterprises,฀while฀at฀the฀same฀time฀prompting the฀question฀of฀whether,฀and฀to฀what฀extent,฀they฀overla p.฀(This฀is฀the normal฀way฀of฀founding฀disciplines.)฀And฀the฀standard฀Anglo-American way฀of฀articulating฀the฀definitio that฀goes฀along฀with฀the฀distinction฀is฀to say฀that฀metaphysics฀is฀concerned฀with฀how฀things฀stand฀in฀the฀world, while฀epistemology฀is฀concerned฀with฀how฀subjects฀get฀to฀be฀mindful฀of these฀ standings-in-the-world-of-things.฀This฀articulation฀of฀the฀difference ฀ between฀fact฀and฀knowledge฀privileges฀the฀fact฀over฀the฀knowledge ฀of฀it:฀it฀puts฀the฀fact฀(and฀hence฀metaphysics)฀in฀the฀independent position฀and฀defines฀knowledge฀(and฀hence฀epistemology)฀in฀terms฀o it.฀This฀way฀of฀proceeding฀in฀analytical฀philosophy฀causes฀two฀distinct problems. The฀first฀is฀that฀it฀suggests,฀quite฀baselessl ,฀that฀a฀def nition฀or฀analysis ฀ can฀be฀found—and฀indeed฀should฀be฀sought—of฀the฀dependent term฀of฀the฀distinction฀in฀terms฀of฀the฀independent฀one฀(among฀other things,฀to฀be฀sure).฀This฀might,฀for฀all฀we฀know ,฀be฀just฀false.฀Bertrand Russell฀begins,฀in฀the฀ 1912 Problems฀of฀Philosophy, with฀a฀distinction฀between ฀fact฀and฀knowledge฀in฀the฀spirit฀outlined฀above,฀adding:฀“The question฀as฀to฀what฀we฀mean฀by฀truth฀and฀falsehood฀. l.l.฀is฀of฀much฀less interest฀than฀the฀question฀as฀to฀how฀we฀can฀know฀what฀is฀true฀and฀what is฀ false.”1 Then,฀ immediately,฀ he—no฀less฀handily฀than,฀for฀example, Edmund฀Gettier,฀and฀considerably฀earlier—generates฀the฀problem฀of the฀analysis฀of฀knowledge฀as฀follows.฀First,฀he฀wonders฀how฀knowledge might฀be฀related฀to฀the฀fact฀it฀purports฀to฀know .฀Is฀knowledge฀merely true฀belief?฀ If฀a฀man฀believes฀that฀the฀late฀Prime฀Minister’ s฀name฀begins฀with฀the฀letter฀B, he฀believes฀what฀is฀true,฀since฀the฀late฀Prime฀Minister฀was฀Sir฀Henr y฀Campbell Bannerman.฀But฀if฀he฀believes฀[we฀can฀add:฀for฀good฀reason]฀that฀Mr .฀Balfour was฀the฀late฀Prime฀Minister ,฀he฀will฀still฀believe฀that฀the฀late฀Prime฀Minister’ s name฀ began฀with฀the฀letter฀B,฀yet฀this฀belief,฀though฀true,฀would฀not฀be thought฀to฀constitute฀knowledge. l.l.l.฀Thus฀it฀is฀clear฀that฀a฀true฀belief฀is฀not knowledge,฀when฀it฀is฀derived฀from฀a฀false฀belief฀[we฀can฀add:฀however฀well฀jus tified ] 2 So฀the฀first฀problem฀caused฀by฀the฀routine฀way฀of฀distinguishing฀be tween฀fact฀and฀knowledge...

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