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Chapter 4
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4 Huic questioni talis poterit adhibere solutio. Multa sunt que cum separari actu non possunt, animo tamen et cogitatione separantur. Vt cum triangulum uel cetera a subiecta materia nullus actu separat, mente tamen segregans ipsum triangulum proprietatemque eius preter materiam speculatur. Amoueamus igitur primi boni presenciam paulisper ex animo, quod esse quidem constat idque ex omnium doctorum indoctorumque sentencia barbararumque {10} gentium religionibus cognosci potest. Hoc igitur paulisper amoto, ponamus omnia esse que sunt bona atque ea consideremus quemadmodum bona esse possent si a primo bono minime defluxissent . Hinc intueor aliud in eis esse quod bona sunt, aliud quod sunt. Ponatur enim una eademque substancia bona esse, alba, grauis, rotunda. Tunc aliud esset ipsa illa substancia, aliud eius rotunditas, aliud color, aliud bonitas. Nam si hec singula idem essent quod ipsa substancia, idem esset grauitas quod color, quod {20} bonum, et bonum quod grauitas; quod fieri natura non sinit. Aliud igitur tunc in eis esset esse, aliud aliquid esse; ac tunc bona quidem essent, esse tamen ipsum minime haberent bonum. Igitur si ullo modo essent, non a bono ac bona essent; ac non idem essent quod bona, set eis aliud esset esse, aliud bonis esse. Quod si nichil aliud essent nisi bona neque grauia neque colorata neque spacii dimensione distenta nec ulla in eis qualitas esset nisi tantum bona essent, tunc non res, set rerum uiderentur esse principium; {30} nec potius uiderentur set uideretur. Vnum enim solumque est huiusmodi quod tantum bonum aliudque nichil sit. Que quoniam non sunt simplicia nec esse omnino poterant nisi ea id quod solum bonum est esse uoluisset. Idcirco quoniam esse eorum a boni uoluntate defluxit bona esse dicuntur. Primum enim bonum quoniam est in eo quod est bonum est. Secundum uero bonum quoniam ex eo fluxit cuius ipsum esse bonum est ipsum quoque bonum est. Set ipsum esse omnium rerum ex {40} eo fluxit quod est primum bonum et quod bonum tale est ut recte dicatur in eo quod est 40 CHAPTER 4 To the question this sort of solution could apply: There are many things, which, although they cannot be separated in actuality, nevertheless are separated by mind and in thought. Thus no one actually separates a triangle or other such items from the underlying matter; nevertheless, distinguishing it in the mind one contemplates the triangle itself and its property outside matter. Let us remove from the mind, therefore, the presence of the First Good for a little while, although it is obvious that It is, which can be known from the conviction of all the learned and of the unlearned, as well as from the {10} religions of the barbarous nations. This, therefore, removed for a little while, let us suppose that all things that are are good, and let us consider how they could be good if they should in no way have flowed down from the First Good. Here I observe that in them that ‘they are good’ is other than that ‘they are.’ For let it be supposed that one and the same substance is good, white, heavy, round. Then that very substance would be one thing, its rotundity another, its color another, its goodness another. For if each of these were the same as its very substance, then weight would be the same as color, the same as {20} good, and good the same as weight, which nature does not permit to happen. Therefore, in them it must be one thing to be, another to be something; and then indeed they might be good, but, nevertheless, they would not possess being itself as good. Therefore, if they were in any way, and were not from the Good, and yet they were good, that they were, would not be the same as that they were good; rather, for them to-be would be other than to-be-good. But if they were nothing else at all except good, neither heavy nor colored nor distended by spatial dimension, nor were there any quality in them except only that they were good, then they would seem not to be things, but the Principle of things; {30} nor would they seem, but rather It would seem. For One alone is of this sort—That It be only Good and nothing else. Because they are not simple, they could not be at all unless That Which alone is Good had willed them to be. Therefore, since their being has flowed down from the will of the Good, they are said to be good...