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3 Article 1 And the first thing to be asked is whether God can make something out of nothing. And it seems that he cannot.1 obj. 1. For God cannot act counter to first principles,2 as for example the whole cannot be greater than its part. But as the Philosopher says in Physics I,3 it is a first principle and axiom of physics that nothing comes out of nothing. Therefore God cannot make something out of nothing. obj. 2. Everything which comes to be was possible before it came to be, for if it were impossible it could not come to be, for nothing is changed to that which is impossible. But the potency by which something is able to be, cannot be except in some subject, since an accident cannot be without a subject. Therefore everything that comes to be comes from matter or a subject. Therefore it is impossible for something to come from nothing. obj. 3. An infinite distance cannot be crossed. But from absolute non-being to being is an infinite distance, which is clear because the less that potency is disposed to act the more distant it is from act. And so if there is no potency at all, the distance will be infinite. Therefore it is impossible for something to pass from absolute nonbeing into being. obj. 4. In On Generation I, the Philosopher says that things which are completely dissimilar do not act on each other, for it is necessary that agent and patient have genus and matter in common.4 But absolute non-being and God have nothing in common. Therefore God is not able to act on absolute non-being, and thus cannot make something from nothing. obj. 5. But it may be said that the preceding argument concerns an agent whose action differs from its substance, and which there1 . For parallel discussions of this question, see Summa theologiae (ST) I Q. 44, a. 2 and Summa contra gentiles (SCG) II 16. 2. communem animi conceptionem. 3. Aristotle, Physics, I 4, 187a29, 33–34. 4. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, I 7, 323b33 and 324b7–8. 4 On Creation fore requires some receiving subject. On the contrary, Avicenna says that if heat were separated from matter, it would act of itself without matter; but nevertheless its action would not be its substance.5 Therefore the fact that God’s action is his essence does not show that he does not require matter. obj. 6. It is a principle of reason that nothing is concluded from nothing. But rational being follows natural being. Therefore also in nature, nothing can come from nothing. obj. 7. If something were made from nothing, the preposition “from” would connote either cause or order. With reference to causes, it seems to connote only the efficient or the material cause. But “nothing” can be neither the efficient nor the material cause of a being , and so in this proposition “from” does not denote cause. Likewise with order since, as Boethius says, there is no order of being to nonbeing .6 Therefore in no way can something come to be from nothing. obj. 8. According to the Philosopher in Metaphysics V, active potency is the cause of change in another thing insofar as it is other.7 But God has only active potency. Therefore he requires some subject of change, and thus cannot make something from nothing. obj. 9. Diversity is found in things inasmuch as one thing is more perfect than another. But the cause of such diversity is not God, who is one and simple. Therefore the cause of this diversity must be matter , and so it is necessary to hold that things which are made are from matter and not from nothing. obj. 10. That which is made from nothing has being after nonbeing . Therefore we can consider an instant which is the last of its non-being, from which point it ceases not being, and an instant which is the first of its being, from which point it begins to be. These are either one and the same instant or distinct instants. If the same, then it follows that two contradictories exist at the same instant. If they are distinct, then since between two instants there is an intermediate time,8 it follows that there would be an intermediate between affirmation and negation, for it cannot be said that it is not after the 5. Cf. Avicenna, Liber de Philosophia Prima sive...

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