Faithfully Seeking Understanding: Selected Writings of Johannes Kuhn

Religion as Feeling or Illusion? A Contrary Position

246 R eligion a s Feeling or Illusion? A Contrary Position Einleitung in die katholische Dogmatik (1846; first edition), 5–14 The following text outlines Kuhn’s differences with Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), whom many consider the father of liberal Protestant theology. In his 1839 essay on faith and reason Kuhn lavished high praise on Schleiermacher . Not unlike Drey and Möhler, Kuhn considered Schleiermacher’s theology worthy of the highest respect despite being deeply problematic. After being lambasted for praising a Protestant, Kuhn responded by outlining his differences with Schleiermacher in numerous essays. Nowhere are his differences with Schleiermacher more forcefully stated than in the following excerpt . Adding to this ambiguity is the matter that Kuhn borrowed much of the Idealist language and idiom made popular by Schleiermacher. Like other Idealists , Schleiermacher often used the language of consciousness together with various prefixes (God, self, religious, etc.) to talk about the human experience of God. Kuhn employs the same categories of knowing, feeling, and doing that Schleiermacher used at the outset of The Christian Faith. Despite the fact that Kuhn learned and likely continued to appreciate elements of Schleiermacher’s theology, his more developed theology moves away from be- Religion as Feeling or Illusion? C 247 ginning with religious sentiment. This movement stemmed from a growing realization that theology following Schleiermacher would leave itself vulnerable to various critiques, of which Ludwig Feuerbach’s The essence of Christianity was the most prominent.1 C In its el f, religion is not a mere knowing, feeling, or doing, nor is it a combination or compilation of the three. rather, in its essence, religion is both simple and all-embracing. religion is all-embracing in the sense that it does not exclude any of the three basic movements that constitute the life of the human spirit. it is simple because these movements are not opposed or separated from one another; instead they are joined together in such fashion that one cannot flourish without the other two. in this straightforward unity, in the total equilibrium between knowing , feeling, and doing, religion cannot fail to make itself known. religion can be brought to light only by manifesting itself as religious belief (theoretical religion, i.e., doctrinal assertion), as religious activity (practical religion , i.e., piety, prayer, cultic activity), and as religious feeling (subjective religion, i.e., immediate religious self-consciousness). religion materializes by allowing one of these realms to develop fully. But one cannot conceive this process in such a way that a certain movement becomes dominant while the other two are wholly excluded. instead, the other two realms also participate in the emergence of religion. and when this happens the emergence of religion corresponds most closely to its essence, and the idea corresponds to the reality of religion. This treatise covers religious faith and inquires into its content and value . nobody disputes that religious consciousness deals with the relation between god and man, and between god and the world. The real question concerns the order of these relations: does god or the human ego emerge as the source and initiator of this relation? is religious faith about bringing god into contact with one’s own ego, or bringing the ego into contact with god? however irrelevant these questions may appear at first glance, every subsequent religious query depends on these prior questions. For 1 The relationship between Schleiermacher and Feuerbach has been recently explained in Michael Buckley’s Denying and Disclosing God (new haven, Conn.: yale university Press, 2004). (tr.) 248 C Religion as Feeling or Illusion? they lead one to answer whether religious faith is subjective or objective, and whether this faith is really a knowing or a mere feeling. as soon as one makes a judgment one way or another, the rubrics for determining the content of faith become clear. From the standpoint articulated above, religious belief is not merely or purely a cognition [Erkenntnis], but a willed knowledge [Wissen] infused by feeling. in no way do we mean to deny that belief is a knowing [Erkennen]; indeed we affirm that the cognitional aspect of faith is fundamental and holds preeminence. religious belief is immediate knowledge. The will’s activity transforms the immediate consciousness of god into a religious experience. Through such an action the content of belief is not imposed, nor is this content first derived from the spirit in any way distorted . rather, this content is taken as...