Good and Evil Actions: A Journey through Saint Thomas Aquinas

7. Moral Species

279 7 | Moral Species Aquinas teaches that human actions alone are good and evil in their very species. Other things are good or evil, but their good or evil does not define what they are. If we are fully to understand Aquinas’s doctrine of the specification of human actions, then, we must see why human actions have their good or evil in their very species. We must first see in what manner an action evil in species must always be evil, no matter the circumstances (section 7.1). These actions, called moral absolutes in the contemporary discussion , are the realization of negative moral rules without exception , for example, the rule “Do not kill an innocent human being.” Proportionalism wishes to say that no such rules exist, unless they are mere tautologies, such as, “Do not kill whom you should not kill.” All other rules, Proportionalism claims, have exceptions. After we examine moral absolutes, we will see what is distinctive of human actions, such that they are good or evil in their very essence (section 7.2). Finally, we will revisit the journey we have taken (section 7.3). Section 7.1. Moral Absolutes 7.1.1. Evil from any Single Defect In an early text, Aquinas divides human actions into four sorts, those that are indifferent, those that are good in species, those that 280 moral species are evil but can become good, and those that are always evil.1 In later writings he tends to ignore the third possibility. In fact, he repeatedly says that an action evil in species can never be made good. In contrast, an action good in species can sometimes become evil by circumstance or intention. Why the asymmetry? Because, says Thomas, what is good requires that everything essential be in place, while evil arises from any single essential defect. A good action must be good in species, have all the proper circumstances, and the proper end intended; an action is evil if it lacks any one of these. When an action is evil in species, then, nothing can make it good, since it already lacks an essential element. The fourth category of actions, then, those actions that are always evil—which in later writings seems to encompass every action evil in species—appears to correspond with moral absolutes. We must take care, however. Aquinas’s standard example of the third category, actions that are evil but can become good, is the act of killing a man. Yet Aquinas’s dictum, that an action evil in species can never become good, might easily apply to the moral species of killing a human being precisely as a human being. We have seen previously (section 5.2.2) that this moral species does not become good. Rather, the natural action with which it is associated can sometimes belong to a different moral species, such as capital punishment . In short, killing a human being—as a moral species—is always wrong, since evil is found in any single defect, but this very moral species can itself disappear in certain concrete circumstances , to be replaced with a morally good species. Since actions occur in the concrete, moral absolutes must be found in an evil species that cannot be removed. Moral absolutes must apply to every singular instance of the natural kind. The question arises whether Aquinas’s fourth category of actions exist, whether any moral absolutes exist, or whether every single evil action fits the pattern of killing a man, which as a moral 1. Quodlibetum, 9, 7, 2 (Leonine ed., vol. 25, 117, 77–119). moral species 281 species can be removed from the corresponding natural species. In short, does every negative precept have some exception, or is there such a thing as a moral absolute, an exceptionless moral norm? To take an example from the contemporary discussion, can the act of contracepting within marriage ever become good? Of itself, it opposes the natural order to new life, but can this order be set aside in need? Perhaps the life of the woman would be threatened through pregnancy. Could the couple, then, intend to have contraceptive sexual relations in order to express their fidelity, setting aside the order to new life? Evil actions that can become good involve a natural action that can relate to two distinct orders of reason, at least one of which can sometimes be removed. The natural act of killing a...