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199 8 The Twofold Discipleship of the Philosopher Faith and Reason in the Thought of Josef Pieper Bernard N. Schumacher Translated by Michele M. Schumacher At the time of his first doctor honoris causa, conferred by the theology faculty of the University of Munich in 1964, Josef Pieper strongly objected to the “error invicibilis” of those who recognized him as a theologian under the pretext that he considered pre-philosophical data in his philosophical act. Declaring his intention to “attack a notion of philosophy which rejects the grandeur of its own origin,”1 he proposed a rediscovery of the concept of philosophy as presented by the Western tradition. His reflection in the aftermath of the Second World War is radically opposed to Barthian thought, for which the attempt to determine a connection or even a systematic distinction between philosophy and theology is extremely grievous: “It is o 1. See Josef Pieper, “Theologie—philosophisch betrachtet,” (1964) with the opening words of his conference, 181. 200 Bernard N. Schumacher evident that theology can be interesting for philosophy,” he insists, “only when philosophy no longer interests theology.”2 The relation between these two sciences has, throughout the history of thought, been constantly at the heart of intellectual discourse and controversy. Either they have been set in a juxtaposition that excludes every intrinsic or accidental connection between them, or one has been reduced to the other. Some hold that philosophy should be liberated from the enslaving tutelage of theology to become a fully autonomous and free science, founded uniquely upon reason. Others maintain that the Christian believer should not aspire to philosophical knowledge, which is perceived as the expression of human pride, a vain trap, or even a prostitute. Noteworthy are the remarks of Tertullian: “What is there, then, about them that is alike, the philosopher and the Christian—the disciple of Hellas and the disciple of Heaven?”3 “What then has Athens in common with Jerusalem? What has the Academy in common with the Church? What have heretics in common with Christians?”4 Still others seek to distinguish these two disciplines—whether in scientific or existential terms—so as to unite them within the larger whole of a “contrapuntal symphony.”5 1. Philosophy as Openness to the Totality of Being Pieper describes the philosophical act—in a general but not vague manner—as a reflection upon the whole of that which the subject perceives or experiences, sensibly and intuitively. This totality of things, which the Greeks call to pan, is considered in its ultimate signification, in its most profound roots and in every possible respect.6 The philosopher always asks, in the last analysis, what in2 . Karl Barth, “Offenbarung, Kirche, Theologie,” 35. 3. Tertullian, Apology, 46:18, 114. 4. Tertullian, The Prescription of Heretics, section 7, 45. 5. Josef Pieper, A Plea for Philosophy, 155 [154]. Philosophy does not stop at a particular moment to be replaced by theology. 6. See Josef Pieper, “The Condition of Philosophy Today,” 24 [203]; Guide to [18.117.183.150] Project MUSE (2024-04-24 19:15 GMT) Faith and Reason 201 trinsically is being: “What is it all about?”7 as Whitehead, cofounder of modern mathematical logic, sums up. By contrast with the specialized or scientific technician, whose methodology requires a precise delimitation of the object of research—an exclusion of all that is exterior to his field of investigation in view of attaining concrete results—the philosopher is above all and essentially orientated toward the whole of reality. His object is not uniquely the whole seized by experience, as in the so-called positive sciences, but simply the whole, the whole of being. Philosophy, whose intentionality is constituted by the emerging of the why, is a rational and systematic reflection upon the ultimate foundation of reality and of human existence, upon their global meaning. The philosophical project tends toward an authentic knowledge that seeks the principles, the ultimate reasons, and breaks away from that knowledge which is of the order of opinion. This conception of philosophy—which rejoins that of the occidental tradition—is opposed, on the one hand, to scientific philosophy, for which there is knowledge, properly speaking, only on the scientific level: that which is observable and measurable and which is delimited by a precise object. In order to obtain valuable results, the philosopher must, according to this perspective, have recourse to the methods of so-called “exact” sciences which determine the parameters of rational human knowledge and to renounce a reflection upon...

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