Who is my neighbor?: personalism and the foundations of human rights

1. Defining Human Rights

1. DE F IN ING HUMAN RIGHTS I f asked    human rights, most people raised nowadays in the Western tradition could easily come up with a considerable number. Answers would range from the right to life and liberty to the right to free speech and from the right to assembly and selfexpression to reproductive rights. Yet if these same people were asked for a definition of rights, most would flounder. While nearly everyone has at least a rudimentary notion of rights, especially as regards their particular instantiations, the concept itself often remains nebulous and elusive. A good definition of rights, however, is of more than academic concern. Many misunderstandings concerning specific rights and their proper application seem to proceed from a shallow understanding of exactly what rights are.1 The present study delves into the anthropological and ethical foundations of human rights. At the outset of such a project it is vital to determine as precisely as possible the nature of the phenomenon whose foundations are being explored. An adequate understanding of the term “rights” will allow access to the ethical bedrock upon which rights rest.2 What exactly are these rights that cry out for a foundation? What does the statement that X has a right to Y actually mean? Do the right to life, the right to vote, the right to bear arms, the right to an education, and  . John Finnis, for example, states that the “grammar of rights is so extensive and supple in its reach that its structure is generally rather poorly understood; misunderstandings in discussions about rights, and about particular (alleged) rights and their extent, are consequently rather frequent” (Natural Law and Natural Rights [Oxford: Clarendon Press, ], ). . “The struggle over human rights,” writes James Schall, “is not just whether the Russians or the Chinese or the Europeans or the Americans or the Third World respect them, but what it is that these rights are that deserves respect” (“Human Rights: The ‘So-Called’ JudaeoChristian Tradition,” ). the right to abortion all have the same root and foundation? These are pressing questions that require a reasoned response. Since language evolves, a first matter to address is what the word “rights” means to men and women of our time. A simple phenomenological survey of common usage can illuminate essential characteristics of rights and help delimit the object of this study. A second step involves comparing the results of this survey with accepted definitions of rights from different epochs. This comparison will show that the basic concept of rights in modern parlance is far from arbitrary; it sinks its roots into a long-standing tradition of philosophical and theological reflection. A clear understanding of that comparison will provide an accurate working definition of human rights that will in turn serve as a dependable point of reference throughout this study.   Phenomenology involves the description and study of observable events in order to better understand what underlies them. To determine what rights are, a phenomenological-linguistic analysis of the way the word is used in everyday conversation can be helpful. What do people have in mind when they speak of rights? What common elements can be discerned between one rights claim and another? Regardless of the validity of specific rights claims, the way the word is used will shed light on its meaning and allow the distinctive features of rights to emerge. Random examples from everyday usage reveal much about how people understand rights. “I have a right to think what I want.” “A woman has a right to do what she wants with her body.” “All people have a right to employment.” “The poor have a right to housing and healthcare.” Typical rights claims like these reveal several key characteristics of rights. A Right Is Something One Has First of all, the words “I have a right .l.l.” or “The poor have a right .l.l.” imply something that can be possessed by a subject. People speak of individuals (or families, or nations, or even animals) as having rights, rather than being rights or righting someone else. A right is understood as separate from the bearer of the right but somehow within his ownership                     or jurisdiction. And regardless of whether one exercises one’s rights or not, one continues to possess them. For example, if someone has a right to migrate, the possession of the right is not contingent on...