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CHAPTER 1 436B8–437A19 436b8 About sense and sensing—what it is and why this affection occurs in animals—something was said before in the discussions On the soul. 436b10 Any animal as animal necessarily has sense-power, for by this we determine that something is an animal or non-animal. 436b12 Taking each of them by itself, touch and taste accompany all necessarily , touch for the cause stated in the discussions On the soul, but taste because of food: for by this it distinguishes the pleasant (good-tasting) and unpleasant (bad-tasting)1 with respect to food, so as to avoid the latter, but pursue the former. And in general, flavor is the affection of the nutritive part of soul. 436b18 But the senses that go through what is external—such as smell, hearing, sight—are in those of them that advance. And they are in all that have them because of health, so that, pre-sensing, they might pursue food, but avoid what is bad and harmful. 437a1 And they are in those that have prudence for the sake of the “well”: for they announce many differences, from which there arises in them discernment of what can be contemplated and what can be done. 437a3 Of these, sight is better for what is necessary and of itself, but hearing for understanding and by accident. 437a5 For the power of sight announces many and many kinds of differences , because all bodies participate in color. Hence the common objects are also better perceived by this; I call size, shape, movement, and number “common.” But hearing announces only differences of sound, but to a few also those of voice. 437a11 But by accident hearing contributes a greater share to prudence. For discussion, being audible, is a cause of learning, not in itself, but by accident; for it consists of words, and each of the words is a symbol. Hence of those deprived from birth of one of the two senses, the blind are wiser than deaf-mutes. 437a18 The power that each sense has has now been discussed. Commentary 436b8 Having presented a prologue in which he has shown his intention , here the Philosopher begins to follow up his proposal. 23 First he determines about what pertains to the external sense-power. Second he determines about certain things pertaining to inner sensitive cognition, namely memory and recollection, where he says About memory and remembering (449b4); for the treatise On memory and recollection is part of the present book according to the Greeks.2 On the first point he does three things. First he takes up some things that were said about the sense-power in the book On the soul and that are to be used as suppositions, as was said above.3 Second, he determines the truth that he intends about the workings of the senses and of sensible objects, where he says At present some inquire (Chapter 2, 437a19). Third, he solves certain difficulties about the foregoing, where he says But someone will raise an objection (Chapter 14, 445b3). On the first point he does two things. First he states what was said about the sense-power in the book On the soul. Second he takes up some of these points, where he says Any animal as animal (436b10). Accordingly he first says that in the book On the soul, something was said about sense and sensing—that is, about the sensitive power and its act. Two things were said about them, namely what each of them is, and the cause why they occur in animals. He calls sensing an “affection” (passio) because the action of sense comes about in a being-affected (paciendo), as was proved in On the Soul II.4 Near the end of On the Soul II he showed what sense is and why animals sense by the fact that animals are able to receive the forms of sensible things without matter.5 436b10 Then, when he says Any animal as animal, he takes up three things that were said about sense in the book On the Soul. The first pertains to sense in general. The second pertains to the senses that are common to all animals; he takes this up where he says Taking each of them by itself (436b12). The third pertains to the other senses, which are found in perfect animals; he takes this up where he says But the senses that go through what is external (436b18). Accordingly he first says...

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