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Letter of Candidus to Victorinus: On the Divine Begetting
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LETTER OF CANDIDUS THE ARIAN TO MARIUS VICTORINUS THE RHETOR ON THE DIVINE BEGETTING I. GENERAL THESIS: GOD IS UNBEGOTTEN AND NONBEGETTING lit·· Y DEAR OLD VICTORINUS, every kind of begetting " ' ~ . is some sort of change. But whatever is divine, namely , God, is unchangeable. Yet God, who is father, is the first cause of all things and in all things. If therefore God is unchanging and unchangeable, but whatever is unchanging and unchangeable is neither begotten nor begetting; if then this is so, God is unbegotten. For begetting is begetting through alteration and through change. II. GOD IS UNBEGOTTEN 1. Nothing Can Beget God Of course, neither substance nor substantiality,t neither an existent being nor essentiality, neither existence nor existentiality nor potentiality have preceded the "to be" of God. For who is more powerful than God? It would not be potentiality, would it, nor existence, nor substance, nor on (an existent)? Either he himself is all of these or they are subsequent to him. For he himself produced them all. But suppose those things preceded him. And how could they beget God if they wished to do so? For they were neither perfect nor self-subsistent; therefore they were imperfect. Since they were lOne of the philosophical fragments (Group II) possibly derived from Porphyry, assembled by Hadot from the writings of Victorinus; see above, Introd., sects. 92 and 93 and Hadot, PV II 27-28. 47 48 MARIUS VICTORINUS imperfect, how by their very own power could they have begotten or made the perfect God? If God, however, is also imperfect, there is no reason to beget what already existed. The reasoning is the same if they were perfect and begot the perfect. To beget God was either without reason or superfluous or impossible. First of all, potentiality is certainly prior, they say, to that which exists. But without act and operation, potentiality by itself cannot come to be something, since it is potentiality, not action; and potentiality without having been empowered cannot beget anything, least of all God. For potentiality remains in that which is potentially "to be," without action. Whence therefore was God born? Therefore , God is unbegotten. (2) Let us see, therefore, whether by some chance substance or substantiality, existence or existentiality preceded God. But substance/ since it is rather a subject of another, is subject of that which is in it, and is different from that which is in it. But no difference is received in God. For when it is God there is nothing in another as other. For God is not anything other than "to be God." For God is something simple. He is not, therefore, from a preexistent substance. God is therefore unbegotten. For it is God who produces substance rather than that substance exists before God. For substance is subject, subject of another thing from which it differs and of which it becomes the receptacle, so that that of which it is the receptacle, being superior to it, is therefore naturally later. In the same way we must understand existence and existentiality .3 Existence differs, however, from existentiality, since existence is already in the state that "to be" belongs to it, but existentiality is the potentiality, so that while it is able "to be," it is not yet itself "to be." Much more, however, does existence differ from substance, since existence is "to be" itself, "to be" which is neither in another nor subject of another but solely "to be" itself, whereas substance has not only "to be" but also has a "to be" something qualified. For it is subject to the qualities within it and on that account is called 2 In denying substance to God Candidus uses Aristotle's notion of substance as subject (composed); Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.3 (1028b33). 3 Another set of philosophical fragments (Group II); see note 1 and Hadot, PV II 21. [107.23.157.16] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 18:02 GMT) FIRST LETTER OF CANDIDUS 49 subject. How therefore was God born of preexisting existence or of existentiality whether these be the power of existence or existence itself if for these existents there is only "to be" and no action or strength and power of acting? (3) Since such is the case, neither the on (existent) nor the ontotes (entity) was prior to God. For they are multiple and composed of substance and quality. If therefore neither potentiality nor existence nor existentiality, all of which have an appearance of simplicity, was prior...