In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

437 Aaron, Thomas supports CIA programs in Kien Hoa, 133 Abrams, Creighton arrives as General Westmoreland’s deputy, 229 devotes more attention to counterinsurgency, 309, 317 instructed by Defense Secretary Laird to accelerate Vietnamization, 307 moves to withdraw MACV advisers from PRU, 329–31 replaces Westmoreland, 301 sees indefinite need for U.S. ground forces, 306 Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC), 301–7 Advance Political Action teams, 121– 22, 130, 133, 137 imprecise mission of, 141, 144, 176, 226 and montagnards, 166 similarity to PAT, 151 agrovilles, 34 Allen, George disagrees with MAAG on VC order of battle, 36 sees alienation of middle-class South Vietnamese, 364 tests Hamlet Evaluation System, 214 view of VC political ascendancy, 222 views on Tet implications for pacification, 288 Alsop, Joseph, 8 American Medical Association, 56 Anderton, John, 24 Anticommunist Denunciation Campaign, 21 decline of, 31 effectiveness of, 26 Tran Ngoc Chau view of, 118 Ap Bac, battle of, 42 Barrows, Leland, 29 Be, Nguyen advocates social revolution, 234–35 becomes chief of RDC training, 199–200 Binh Xuyen, 8, 16 Blaufarb, Douglas Anticommunist Denunciation Campaign, view of, 23 Ngo Dinh Nhu, relationship with, 28–30 Bohannon, Charles T. R., 186 Bosco, Brother, 74. See also Combat Youth Brewster, Daniel given controversial briefing by Robert Haynes, 176–77 Bruce, Karl as CIA adviser in Vinh Binh Province, 206 Index Index 438 Bruce, Karl (cont.) leads pacification of Tieu Can District, 204–8 Buddhist Struggle Movement, 192–94 Bumgardner, Everett, 152 sees VIS and CIA programs as compatible, 147 Bundy, McGeorge briefed on PAT program, 158 presses Lodge on pacification management, 188 sees lack of civilian program to match military effort, 181 Bunker, Ellsworth becomes ambassador in Saigon, 229 optimistic about APC results, 306 refuses to acknowledge CIA pessimism, 347–48 sides with CIA against Colby organizational proposals, 340–41 supports military staffing of PRU program, 329 urges land grab strategy on President Thieu, 301 Buu, Nguyen Van heads “shrimp soldiers” and “cinnamon soldiers,” 115, 123 Campbell, Paul helps establish CIDG, 46–8, 51, 54 Can, Ngo Dinh, 62, 65 allows corruption in program administration, 115 competes with brother Nhu, 84 sees Force Populaire as revolutionary, 88 Cao Dai, 2, 8, 17, 144 Cao Van Vien. See Vien, Cao Van Carver, George A. becomes special assistant for Vietnam affairs (SAVA), 298 as deputy SAVA, 203 emphasizes PRU efficiency, 327 on merits of CIA pacification doctrine, 203 pessimistic about RDC prospects, 298 sees Diem as boil to be lanced, 37 view of peasantry as apolitical, 212, 362 welcomes land grab tactic, 301 Caswell, John, 29 pessimism over future of new Diem government, 7 Census-Grievance program Buddhist hostility to, 165 during Tet offensive, 288, 291–92 effectiveness of, 134–35 exploited for political purposes, 242–43 failure in Kien Phong, 146 implemented in Quang Nam Province, 247–50, 252, 261 implemented in Vinh Binh Province, 206 inadequate CIA staffing of, 321 inconsistent guidance to, 217 Kien Hoa counterinsurgency, core of, 128–30, 133 as national program, 173, 189 as pacification criterion, 213 and Phoenix, 269–71 termination of, 314–16, 335 Viet Cong reaction to, 138 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) adopts MACV’s HES pacification criteria, 313 CORDS, relationship with, 230–31, 264–65, 309 counterinsurgency, leadership role in, 2, 4–5, 42, 179–82, 188 improvisational style of, xvi, 27, 112–116 MACV, relationship with, 42, 78, 90, 152, 155, 161, 179, 215 Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), 255 [3.133.131.168] Project MUSE (2024-04-19 05:35 GMT) Index 439 CIA penetration operations with, 259 fabricated product of, 267 Chau, Tran Ngoc alienates Saigon station, 197 becomes Kien Hoa province chief, 116 chafes under U.S. controls, 196 criticizes U.S. advisers, 183, 197 develops counterinsurgency techniques, 119–20 early career of, 116–120 integrates application of U.S. resources, 141 nominated by CIA for MRD position, 182 recommends Nguyen Be for MRD position, 199 resigns from the army, 198 runs Kien Hoa counterinsurgency programs, 120–22, 127–40 and Vung Tau mutiny, 198 writes pacification plan, 182–83 CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Citizens’ Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) camps overrun in VC attacks, 97 combat effectiveness of, 59 decay, 106–10 economic self-help focus of, 57 and the ethnic Cambodian minority, 97–99 militarization of, 82, 95 and montagnard rebellions, 166–67 and mutual montagnard-Vietnamese hostility, 60 named by Colby, 51 strategic concept for, 54 trained by U.S. Special Forces, 56 transferred to MACV control, 92, 102 and U...

Share