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2. Lessons from Afghanistan
- The University Press of Kentucky
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13 LESSONSFROMAFGHANISTAN LessonsfromAfghanistan 2 September11,2001,markedthebeginningofanewmillennium .1 Itwasatraumaticeventforallwholivedthrough it,eventhosewhodidnotlosefamilyorfriendsbutmerely watchedthetragedyontelevision.Notsincetheattackon PearlHarborin1941hadtheUnitedStatesbeenstruckbyan enemyonitsownsoil.Thisparticularenemywasnotevena nation-statebutratheraninternationalterroristmovement,al Qaeda,inspiredbyarigidlyanachronisticversionofIslamand ledbyOsamabinLaden.Americans’initialshockandsadness quicklyturnedtoanger.Littletimewasspentreflectingonthe supposedreasonsfortheattackontheWorldTradeCenterand thePentagon—namely,U.S.supportforcorruptArabregimes suchasthoseofSaudiArabiaandEgypt,aswellassupportfor IsraelipolicywithregardtothePalestinians.Talkofrevenge wasrampant,andtherewasasense,legitimateornot,ofinnocence violated.HatredofIslamicfundamentalismintensified, andthebeliefinaninevitableconflictbetweenOccidentand Orient,orwhatneoconservativessuchasBernardLewisand SamuelHuntingtontermeda“clashofcivilizations,”gripped thepopularimagination.Therewasneveranydoubtthatthe UnitedStatesshouldseekretributionforthevictimsof9/11. ThiswasthecontextinwhichtheUnitedStatesdecidedto bombAfghanistanandoverthrowitsIslamicfundamentalist leadership—theTaliban—whichwasopenlyprotectingbin LadenandalQaeda. 14 PEACEOUTOFREACH Internationallawdoesnotdenyanationtherighttodefend itselfwhenattacked.2 PresidentGeorgeBushinsistedthat Afghanistanhandovereveryterrorist,closeeverytraining facility,andgivetheUnitedStatestheauthoritytocarryout inspections.3 TheseweredifficultdemandsfortheTalibanto accept.Butrejectingthemmeantignoringboththeimperative foractiondictatedbyanationalconsensusintheUnitedStates andsupportfromaninternationalcoalitionthatwasappalled bythesavageattacksof9/11.TheTalibanclearlymisreadthe situation,andtheirdiplomaticattemptsatnegotiationwere, accordingtooneobserver,like“graspingsmoke.”Theirefforts wereseenasaformofstalling.TheBushadministration wishedtoactquickly,anditsdesiretoavengeacriminalact againstinnocentciviliansandbringtheculpritstojustice—if notbegina“waronterror”againstanill-definedenemy—initially seemedreasonable. AttackingAfghanistandidnoteliminatealQaeda,whose transnationalorganizationhasappropriatelybeencalleda“network ofnetworks.”ButthebombingofAfghanistansucceeded indestroyinganumberoftrainingbasesandabarbaricregime thathadservedasanimportantsanctuaryforalQaeda.4 Militants suchasOsamabinLadenandtheleaderoftheTaliban, MullahOmar,wereforcedtogounderground,fleetoremote areas,orretreatintoPakistan.Soon,however,theUnitedStates seemedtoloseinterestinfindingthesenewcelebrities.More importantly,fourthousandAfghancivilianswerekilled,tensof thousandswerewounded,andhalfamillionwerelefthomeless .5 ThesenumbersdwarfthenumbersofAmericanskilled andwoundedbytheassaultof9/11.Itforcesanydecentperson toatleastconsiderwhatAlbertCamuscalledthe“principle ofreasonableculpability”whenengaginginmilitaryaction,as wellasthepracticalandmoralcostsofignoringit. Whetherthisimbalanceinsacrificeandlackofproportion- [3.144.124.232] Project MUSE (2024-04-16 20:47 GMT) 15 LESSONSFROMAFGHANISTAN alitycouldhavebeenavoided,orwhetherdifferentmilitary proceduresshouldhavebeenundertaken,remainsanopen question.Indisputable,however,isthefactthattheTaliban regimewaswillingtosacrificeitscitizensratherthanhand overthecriminalsresponsiblefor9/11.Parcelingoutguilt alwaysseemsbothgrotesqueandfutile.Butitisimportantto understandthattheTalibanwascomplicitinwhattranspired inthenationitruled.Theburdenofculpabilitydoesnotfall onlyontheUnitedStates.Nevertheless,giventhelackof proportionalityintermsofthesacrificesmadebythecitizens ofAfghanistanandthoseoftheUnitedStates,itisnecessary tohighlighttheimportancethatshouldhavebeenattachedto thereconstructionofAfghanistan.6 EvenafterKabulfell,theUnitedStatesstillpossessedthe moralhighground.Itsdemandforjustice,fortheprosecution ofOsama...