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1 introduction The Franco-American Alliance and Vietnam the StORy OF ameRican inteRventiOn in vietnam begins with an alliance—the sometimes ambivalent, often contentious, and almost always misunderstood Franco-american alliance. paris and Washington clashed repeatedly over how to respond to the dual threat of communism and nationalism in vietnam when the forces of the cold War and decolonization collided there during the 1950s. When a colonial power leaves a former colony , the new state usually grapples with growing pains on its own. in this case, the South vietnamese were never given the chance as the Dwight D. eisenhower administration systematically replaced French control in South vietnam with american influence. Why and how the United States did so are the core questions of this book. in answering these questions, a transnational perspective is critical.1 Throughout the 1950s, a significant cast of characters—including paris, Washington, london, Saigon, hanoi, moscow, and Beijing—had a major impact on the denouement of events in indochina.2 There is a world of difference between the 1950s, when the United States played the role of puppet just as often as that of puppeteer, and the 1960s, when U.S. policy was the most important of any country’s in determining the course of american intervention in vietnam.3 in the earlier decade, a host of great and small powers vied to pull the strings; but by the end of eisenhower’s presidency there was only one puppet master. The story contained within these pages, featuring the Franco-american alliance as the main character, explains how—much to the consternation of the French—the United States emerged as that puppet master. The primary focus, therefore, rests on intra-alliance politics, among those who claimed to be on the same side. Decision making at the highest levels in paris and Washington, and how these decisions played out domestically and abroad, receive the lion’s share of attention.4 particular emphasis is placed on Franco-  Replacing France american unwillingness to work together against the communist threat in vietnam. Saigon and london had major supporting roles, as they, too, often made a united policy against their adversaries in moscow, Beijing, and hanoi more difficult. The Soviets, chinese, and north vietnamese occupy more minor, but critical, parts in the story. Ultimately, the decision to replace France came from american officials’ certainty that their methods to create a viable noncommunist South vietnamese nation had the best chance of success. momentous steps such as the gulf of tonkin Resolution, Operation Rolling Thunder, and the commitment of ground troops dramatically increased the U.S. presence in vietnam in the 1960s; however, this book is concerned with the evolving process of american involvement—the groundwork, so to speak—that began in the 1950s. long before decisions made in the 1960s led to the americanization of the war in vietnam, an entire bureaucracy was set in motion on the political, military, economic, and cultural levels that paved the way for the americanization of vietnam itself. The mechanism that activated this machinery and sustained it, at least until the end of the eisenhower administration, was the Franco-american alliance. in short, Franco-american discord ensured the decline of French influence and the rise of american power in South vietnam. For this reason, american intervention in vietnam can be understood only within the context of the French exit from vietnam, an exit abetted by the United States. even though they faced the same threat, american and French leaders proved incapable of agreeing on a common policy to stop the communists in vietnam. The question is, Why? What explains the mutual suspicion and animosity between paris and Washington in the 1950s and the regular flareups ever since? after all, although they differ in terms of power and tactics, France and the United States are still allies, who should, in theory, collaborate . and yet this alliance breaks down with alarming frequency. When members of an alliance fail to cooperate, as in vietnam, the potential fallout can be serious, as each player pursues an independent, contradictory, and sometimes directionless policy. a more recent example occurred in 2003, when French and american leaders, as well as their publics, preferred to savage each other in the diplomatic arena and press instead of hammering out their differences to forge a common strategy toward iraq. americans expressed bafflement and anger over French president Jacques chirac’s contention that the “use of force [was] not a solution” to the iraqi conundrum [3.128.199...

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