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CHAPTER 7 Jtl The Legacy of the Crises of the 1890s ~ As the new route from the North Atlantic to Asia was set, many areas vital for the transit were immersed in turmoil. U.S. self-interest fed, then repressed , revolutions in Santo Domingo, Haiti, Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippines. Washington officials have steadfastly maintained that these areas "benefited" from U.S. military occupation or protectorate status . The validity ofthis assertion needs testing. Mexico, Honduras, and China experienced internal disorder and brief U.S. intervention (in China, with a host of other Asian and European powers). The War of 1898 was not just a glitch in the histories of Spain, Cuba, the Philippines, China, and the United States, but part of their domestic developments and their response to the economic crisis of the 1890s. The significant task undertaken -fulfilling Columbus's dreams of a reliable route to the vast wealth of East Asia-incorporated perpetual disorder, conflict, security issues, cultural dominance, and a quest to control raw materials, investment opportunities, and distribution. Positive, but also negative, aspects of competition and conflict were integral to a laissez-faire liberal order. The U.S. conquests in Asia and the Caribbean prompted fresh policies to implement U.S. objectives. The open door notes expressed U.S. wishes for a new relationship with Asia, just as the revived Pan-Americanism (the Mexico City meeting in 1901) did for the New World. Secretary of State John Hay, architect of the open door policy, characterized U.S. activity in the 1890s as part of "a cosmic tendency." He recognized the utility of the Philippines for Asian trade.l Scholars commonly note the transforming mark of the War of 1898 upon the Caribbean region, but less often the impact of 1898 upon Oceania and Asia. The U.S. government expected to alleviate its internal socio- The Legacy ofthe Crises 103 economic disorder and the Cuban and Chinese crises by interacting with Asian societies, a goal that required an interoceanic canal. The complex nature ofliberal imperialism was reflected in U.S. politics. The fate of the Philippines and of imperialism was less an issue than it appeared in the 1900 election campaign between President William McKinley and Democratic and Populist candidate William Jennings Bryan. Bryan, an opponent of imperialism, had urged Democratic legislators to accept annexation in 1898 and then make the acquisition the basis ofthe presidential election . McKinley pleaded ignorance ofvarious critiques ofannexation. As Hoar noted, "Bryan sinned through cynicism while McKinley merely erred through ignorance."2 The choice for u.s. society in the 1900 election was sin or error. U.S. acquisitions during and soon after the War of 1898-Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Panamanian canal zone, the Virgin Islands, Hawaii, Samoa, Guam, Wake Island, and the Philippines-challenged other great power aspirations in the Caribbean and Pacific basins. Germany, with little empire, but forced to compete for power and prestige with the established empires, had difficulty adjusting. The intensifying worldwide U.S.German competition stimulated the German government to draft operational war plans in the late 1890s which were reviewed and revised periodically. German plans assumed that the United States- a likely opponent- was most vulnerable in the Caribbean and isthmian region. German naval officials planned to seize the poorly fortified U.S. Caribbean bases and to use them to attack U.S. trade centers.3 Between 1902 and 1905, however, German naval planning subordinated the Caribbean area to Anglo-Saxon competition in Europe, Africa, and East Asia. When U.S. officials made clear in 1899 their desire to acquire and fortify the French canal concession at Panama, the British reluctantly surrendered their rights under the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 and demanded instead demilitarized transit. After the U.S. Senate rejected a 1900 [John1Hay-[Julian1 Pauncefote draft treaty that did not allow U.S. militarization ofthe canal zone, the revised Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901 was a one-sided concession to the U.S. government. France's New Panama Canal Company was not so accommodating . It demanded an exorbitant price, so Admiral John G. Walker's Interoceanic Canal Commission recommended a canal in Nicaragua in 1901. Since a Nicaragua canal would have removed any value for the Panama concession , the French company wisely reduced its price 60 percent and sold its rights to the U.S. government in 1903.4 Many Mexican leaders considered U.S. action in Spanish Cuba disturbing , but U.S. subversion of Colombian sovereignty...

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