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Recent Developments in the Chinese Military June Teufel Dreyer The elderly party leaders who gathered together the morning after the military quelled demonstrations at Tiananmen Square and a hundred other cities in China in June 1989 must have been profoundly disconcerted by the events they had witnessed. Immediately dubbed the Eight Immortals, after the Daoist deities of Chinese legend, several of them remembered the demonstrations against the Chinese government in May 1919 that had been instrumental in the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Now they, the survivors of the revolutionary era, had become the target of a new generation of rebellious youth. Moreover, the reaction of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) called into question its adherence to a major tenet of Mao Zedong’s creed—that the party must always control the gun; the gun must never control the party. When ordered to deal with the demonstrators, a number of officers and soldiers said openly, in the presence of television cameras, that the people’s army should not be used against the people. Some commanders expressed reluctance to use force against the demonstrators, and several retired military icons of the revolutionary era reportedly sent a letter to the leadership opposing the use of the PLA in this manner. Deng Xiaoping must have reflected on the wisdom of his 1982 decision to more clearly differentiate the party, government, and military hierarchies. THE AFTERMATH OF THE TIANANMEN INCIDENT Other events external to China would reinforce the conviction that a strong response was needed. Later in 1989, the Romanian army joined demonstrators in overthrowing the Communist government; a democratic SIXTEEN 285 286 Y June Teufel Dreyer republic was proclaimed, and the country’s long-serving president, Nicolae Ceauşescu, and his wife were executed. In the Soviet Union, the military did not intervene to save communism. Not only was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union turned out of power, but the nation itself disintegrated. Communism, and those who had ruled in its name, were discredited all over Europe. Although the Chinese leadership doubtless counted itself fortunate to have escaped this annus horribilis, its members were aware that a reprise of the demonstrations might portend a similar fate for them. Deng Xiaoping had been able to cajole hesitant military leaders to obey by virtue of his military experience in the civil war that had confirmed the CCP in power in 1949 and his close connections with the PLA, but it was unlikely that any future leader would be able to do so. Jiang Zemin, whom Deng had designated as his heir apparent, had no military credentials, and the PLA had been successful in blocking an earlier heir apparent, Hu Yaobang, from appointment as head of the party’s Central Military Commission (CMC) for similar reasons. Measures were quickly instituted to obtain loyalty. Those commanders who had hesitated to obey orders were dismissed. Several loyal commanders , including Yang Shangkun, who simultaneously held the position of president of China, and his half brother Yang Baibing were eased out of the military hierarchy to ensure that they would not adversely impact Jiang Zemin’s place in the succession. Officers and men were required to take loyalty oaths to reinforce the dictum that this was the party’s army. The notion that the military should serve the state rather than the party, which had apparently gained credence in some informal military salons, was declared anathema, and the seminars themselves closed down. Military training was mandated for college students; at the most demonstration-prone institutions, the course was scheduled to occupy the entire freshman year. After a time, this highly unpopular measure, which students regarded as punitive, was discontinued. A patriotism campaign began. Radio and television featured patriotic music. Films and television programs extolled the heroic deeds that had brought the People’s Republic of China (PRC) into existence, with a heavy emphasis on the military’s part in the war of liberation. The PLA’s literature and art division budgeted $221.3 million—far in excess of the budgets for all 150 films made in China during 1989—to produce a three-part epic, Great Strategic Battles. The creation of an external enemy was also helpful in achieving postTiananmen unity. The United States proved especially useful in this regard. Initially, President George H. W. Bush was reluctant to impose sanctions on the Chinese government, arguing that quiet diplomacy would be more effective and that, in any case, the PRC would evolve peacefully into a...

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