A Military History of China

15. China's Foreign Conflicts since 1949

China’s Foreign Conflicts since 1949 Larry M. Wortzel China’s leaders have tended to use force as an instrument of foreign policy when they believed it was important to take a strong stand on matters affecting sovereignty, including reinforcing territorial claims; to maintain safe buffer zones, free from what Beijing perceived as foreign intervention ; and to back up strong diplomatic threats with the coercive power to make other countries take China seriously. This approach is deeply rooted in Chinese history, where strong states established relations of suzerainty over weaker ones, regarding them as “vassal states” (shuguo) and punishing them with military expeditions when they failed to do the bidding of the stronger kingdom. From the time of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 to 1988, Beijing used force to resolve international disputes in numerous cases: the Korean War in 1950, two artillery bombardments and crises over Taiwan’s offshore islands in 1954 and 1958, incursions into Burma in 1960 and 1961, road construction in Laos and the provisions of air defense protection there in the 1960s, the war with India in 1962, a mobilization on the Indian border in 1965 to relieve pressure on Pakistan by Indian forces, border skirmishes with the Soviet Union in 1969, large military deployments to Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, the seizure of the Paracel Islands in 1974, a standoff with Japan over the Senkaku Islands in 1978, the Chinese attack into Vietnam in 1979, and the seizure of islands in the Spratly Archipelago in 1988.1 China has also exercised its military might by firing missiles off Taiwan in 1995 and 1996; by seizing Mischief Reef, claimed by the Philippines, in 1995; and by threatening to employ nuclear weapons against the United States in the event it came to the aid of Taiwan should Beijing use force to reunite the island with the mainland. FIFTEEN 267 268 Y Larry M. Wortzel On April 1, 2001, in response to a U.S. Navy aerial reconnaissance mission over international waters, a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Naval Air Force fighter aircraft attempted to intercept the U.S. EP-3 aircraft. The two collided seventy miles off Hainan Island, seriously damaging the American plane. The Chinese fighter crashed, killing the pilot. China’s aircraft and vessels also harassed two unarmed American ocean surveillance vessels operating in international waters off China in 2009. In addition, the PRC deployed a naval task force to the Gulf of Aden in 2008 to operate independently of but alongside a multinational counterpiracy effort in the region. In every instance of China’s use of force, its leaders have claimed that their actions were based solely on self-defense. And because of its expansive territorial claims, China’s diplomatic and military establishments maintain that only in rare cases do China’s forces enter foreign territory: Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in 1979. In some cases, of course, Beijing doesn’t acknowledge that its forces were deployed in combat, such as in Vietnam and Laos during the war with the United States in the 1960s and 1970s. It is useful to clarify what the use of force means in general military terminology , for what is true in general is also applicable to China. A simplistic understanding of the term would be the conduct of overt military action by the PLA in an actual attack on another country or sovereign state. But the use of force can be subtler than that, and it may not amount to actual combat. Military demonstrations are also a use of force, as are well-timed military exercises, weapons tests, and troop, naval, or air deployments. In November 2000, for instance, Beijing tested its newest-generation roadmobile missile, the DF-31, while the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, General Hugh Shelton, was visiting China. This not-sosubtle demonstration of force was meant to underscore just how seriously Beijing takes American military sales to Taiwan. China’s aggressive intercepts of American reconnaissance flights—such as the aforementioned collision in April 2001—represent demonstrations of force. In late May and early June 2001, the PLA conducted an extensive series of amphibious exercises in the area of Dongshan Island in south China, exercises timed to show Beijing’s displeasure over Taiwan president Chen Shui-bian’s visit to New York on May 21–23 and his meetings with American citizens. Thus, a military training evolution involving an overflight of...