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Introduction 1. C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practices (1906; Wakefield, England: EP, 1976), 126. 2. See Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 2004), 278, 146n. 3.At one time mostAmerican schoolchildren knew that the climactic event of theAmerican War of Independence was the surrender of General Cornwallis at Yorktown; few, however, knew that Cornwallis had retreated to Yorktown largely to escape American guerrillas. 4.TheU.S.Army/MarineCorpsCounterinsurgencyFieldManual(Chicago:Univ.of ChicagoPress,2007).Forjusttwoexamplesofsuchcriticism,seeEdwardLuttwak, “Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice,” Harper’s (Feb. 2007); and Gian P. Gentile, “The Selective Use of History in the Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” Army History 72 (Summer 2009). 5. C.H.V. Sutherland, The Romans in Spain (1939; Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1982). 6. Bernard Brodie, “The Continuing Relevance of On War,” in Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), 54; Ian F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750 (London: Routledge , 2001), 249–50. 7.Austin Long, The ‘Other War’: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), 15; Lesley Anne Warner, “Conclusions: Lessons Learned for Future Counterinsurgencies,” in Money in the Bank: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 69 (my italics). Notes 8. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2007), li–liii. See also Ian F.W. Beckett, Insurgency in Iraq: An Historical Perspective (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005); Colin S. Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006). Certainly, insurgents learn, or try to learn, from past insurgencies; see Christopher C. Harmon, “Illustrations of ‘Learning’ in Counterinsurgency,” Comparative Strategy 11 (1992). 9. William Rosenau, “Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Iraq andAfghanistan ,” Harvard International Review 31 (Spring 2009): n.p. 10. Aristotle, The Politics, book 5, chap. 6; Vladimir I. Lenin, “Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder,” in Collected Works of V.I. Lenin (Moscow: Progress, 1964), 31:17–118; Crane Brinton, Anatomy of Revolution (1936; NewYork: Vintage, 1965); Chorley, Armies; and see alsoAnthony James Joes, From the Barrel of a Gun: Armies and Revolution (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1986). 11. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince; Skocpol, States and Revolutions; Record, Beating Goliath; O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism. 1. China 1. Pye, “China: Erratic State,” 58. 2. Fairbank, “Reunification of China,” 14; in the original, the entire sentence is in italics. 3. The Great Taiping Rebellion (1850–64), one of the major wars of the century, was both nationalist (against the Manchu dynasty) and egalitarian (against the Confucian elites); Fairbank, Great Chinese Revolution, 73. The rebels actually captured and held Nanking for years, and no one knows for sure how many millions perished in the upheaval. See the excellent study by Wright, Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism. For the Nien conflict, see Chiang, Nien Rebellion; and Teng, Nien Army. 4. Fairbank, Great Chinese Revolution, 81. 5. One very notable exception to this statement is the extraordinary story of Matteo Ricci (1552–1610).An Italian Jesuit, Ricci entered China in 1582, became accepted as a member of the literati, and eventually served as mathematician and astronomer at the Imperial court. He sent to Europe its first modern detailed report on China. See Vincent Cronin, The Wise Man from the West (New York: Dutton, 1955); and Spence, Memory Palace of Ricci. 6. Zarrow, China in War and Revolution, 7. “In a sense the whole history of modernChinacanbeseenasareactiontoimperialism,anoutsideforcethatthreatened the country’s very existence.” Bianco, Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 140. 7. Young, Presidency of Yuan, 254. 252 ■ Notes to Pages 3–6 [3.15.221.136] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 00:26 GMT) 8. Fairbank, Great Chinese Revolution, 161. 9. Young, Presidency of Yuan, esp. chap. 8. 10. See Pye, Warlord Politics; McCord, Power of the Gun; Ch’i, Warlord Politics. 11. Zarrow, China in War and Revolution, 86. 12. Johnson, Autopsy on People’s War, 13. 13. Studies of Sun abound. See Bergère, Sun Yat-sen; Linebarger, Sun Yat-sen. 14. See Fairbank, “Maritime and Continental.” 15. Sheridan, China in Disintegration. 16. Ibid., 230. Canton was the first Chinese port regularly visited by Europeans ; the far-sailing Portuguese secured a foreign trade monopoly there in 1511. Canton is ninety miles from Hong Kong and sixty-five...

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