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771  32  Après le Déluge November marked the lowest ebb of Allied fortunes in the campaign in northwestern Europe. Montgomery, whatever his shortcomings, could never be faulted on his professional acumen. As he pointed out, Eisenhower’s 28 October outline strategy—it could never claim to be more—amounted to little. Nothing about the autumn fighting along the frontiers reflected well on Allied generalship. The lull in offensive actions in October underscored the supply and manpower constrictions imposed on Allied commanders. Eisenhower’s decision to attack everywhere —in the Netherlands, north and south of Aachen, in Lorraine, and in Alsace—produced no strategic advantage. Dividing the main American thrusts between Hodges and Patton, separated by the Ardennes, meant that neither supported the other. Despite the German success attacking through the Ardennes in 1940, SHAEF wrote off using this avenue for an advance into Germany. Just as intriguing, the Germans gambled on holding the Ardennes front with minimal forces. By mutual contrivance, the Ardennes became a kind of dead zone. November also marked the nadir of SHAEF’s influence. The September question—what did SHAEF amount to?—was answered by an emphatic not much. Increasingly the object of derision, Eisenhower exerted little discernible influence on events; nor did Smith in SHAEF. Fully convinced of the correctness of his approach, the supreme commander devolved responsibility for the conduct of operations on his field commands. Bradley sanctioned pointless and unproductive offensives based only on the belief that, as in Normandy, the Germans would eventually crack. Despite ComZ’s best efforts, its October deliveries only approached sustainment levels; not until mid-November did circumstances permit the establishment of “on paper” reserves. The opening of Antwerp held 772  BEETLE out the promise of a daily infusion of 20,000 tons into an American line of communications shortened by two-thirds. Although Antwerp might ease supply worries, there was no easy remedy to the pending manpower crisis. The November offensives lengthened casualty lists. In that month, U.S. forces suffered 62,437 battle casualties—significantly more than those sustained in the ferocious hedgerow fighting in July. Nonbattle losses spiraled up to 56,211—double those of October and more than four and a half times those incurred in Normandy. And just under 90 percent of the casualties fell on the combat arms, 70 percent on the infantry.1 As became increasingly evident—and it came as a great shock to SHAEF—the time would soon arrive when the manpower pool ran dry. In September Eisenhower commanded thirty-four American divisions; only twenty-four remained in the United States. In late October Marshall again offered to accelerate the movement of divisions into the theater : three by mid-November, four more by early December, and an additional five by the middle of the month—half of strategic reserves.2 Eisenhower accepted, even though SHAEF could neither supply the divisions already in line much above subsistence levels nor move forward additional ones already in theater. Divisions went forward with only their three infantry regiments, shorn of their artillery, tanks, and support units. Owing to faltering War Department manpower policies, the unbloodied 1944 divisions lacked the fighting power of their 1943 cousins . Worse, the veteran divisions—especially in First Army—were shells of their former selves. All the veteran divisions faced debilitating shortages in riflemen, an ever-increasing portion of their ranks filled with undertrained replacements. The replacement system itself stood on the verge of collapse. Amazingly, Marshall reported that the CCS was considering a directive calling for an all-out effort to end the war in Europe “at an early date” before January 1945. In his estimate, the offer of the dozen divisions would put SHAEF over the top. This hubris illustrated just how far removed Washington remained from the realities at the front—a situation never clarified by any of Eisenhower’s communications. Brooke scornfully dismissed Marshall’s “wonderful telegram” and commented, “He seems to consider that if we really set our heart on it, and bank on its happening, irrespective of what happens in the future should we fail to do so, we ought to be able to finish the war before the end of the year!”3 By the end of November the Allies held the initiative all along the line, had advanced to the West Wall ahead of the D+360 projections, had eroded German divisions, enjoyed air superiority with an intensifying strategic bombing campaign, and continued their buildup, but the [18.217...

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