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525  24  “We Conduct Our Wars in a Most Curious Way” Smith returned to Algiers on 21 October. As Hughes reported, he “hastened to report to Ike. Wonder if he knows the answer to Ike’s future?”1 Speculation on “Ike’s future” gripped Algiers. All Smith could tell Eisenhower was that nothing had been set in stone. He could forget about a field command in Overlord, however; Marshall thought that would represent too much of a step-down for a theater commander. Smith’s best guess was that Eisenhower would return to Washington as chief of staff.2 That estimate pretty much conformed to what Harriman had told Eisenhower on 15 October. Harriman had spoken of the president ’s great reluctance in sacrificing Marshall, but if he did, Eisenhower would succeed him as chief of staff.3 The next night Patton flew in from Sicily. He, Eisenhower, and Hughes ate dinner together. “It was like old times—almost,” Patton wrote to his wife. Naturally, they talked about the future. “No one including Devine Destiny knows what is to become of us.”4 Smith may have known more than he revealed. He certainly made no effort to hide the fact that he expected to leave the Mediterranean. Just before Smith had left for Washington, another major turf battle with Hughes loomed. This time Smith, intent on succeeding, carefully marshaled his reserves, and they were considerable. At the beginning of August the War Department again solicited from Smith an explanation of how NATO fit into the Allied command structure.5 He made his deputy assistant chief of staff for operations, BG William C. Crane, head of a stacked committee. The War Department demanded a table of organization for both AFHQ and NATO and detailed descriptions of functions and the division of responsibilities. Crane chaired three general meetings interspersed throughout August. To no one’s surprise, 526  BEETLE the committee experienced real difficulty putting on paper a flow chart and an account of how the structure functioned. Finally, at the end of September, the report made its way to Smith.6 At the same juncture, the senior officers in Algiers were nervous about the impending move of the headquarters to Italy. “Movement of AFHQ growing hotter every day,” Hughes noted on 30 September. “Rank, prestige, wishes, desires, hates etc all enter into it. Why can’t we concentrate on the war?” Just as Smith was preparing his onslaught, he was called to Washington. Upon his return, everyone expected another bureaucratic bloodletting. It never happened; the urgency disappeared. “Ike tells Beadle he and I are coordinate ,” Hughes recorded on 27 October, and “any idea that AFHQ is to operate NATOUSA is out.” Hughes wondered, “Does Smith like that?” The next day Smith called Hughes on the phone and talked about the organization in Italy. He told a shocked Hughes that he possessed no personal interest in it. The following day a still disbelieving Hughes found “Beadle in cheerful mood. Most agreeable. Must be on his way out.” A week later Hughes again predicted, “an explosion due. Beadle has been quiet for three days.” But none came. 7 As far back as the first week of September, Smith was already thinking in terms of his eventually going to England. He exchanged a number of lengthy memos with Moses, now the American G-4 on the cross-Channel planning staff (COSSAC) in London. They discussed supply planning for the cross-Channel operation, Bolero preparations, and the theater command structure. As part of his campaign for restructuring the theater headquarters, Smith presented his rationale for wanting Hughes moved into AFHQ as the American CAO in command of all administrative and supply services; Devers experimented along the same lines in ETO with Lee. The most vocal opponent of functionalized command structures in the War Department was Moses, who raised a number of objections to Smith’s proposal. That came as no surprise. What is revealing , although neither officer said as much, was that both proceeded on the assumption that Smith would ultimately exercise an influence in forming the headquarters for Overlord.8 Eisenhower assumed he was on his way out too. “Ike wants plan for American operation in event there be a British C in C.” Hughes surmised, “I guess Ike is going home.” The next evening Eisenhower invited Hughes for dinner. “Sat next to Kay at Ike’s invitation,” Hughes snidely remarked. “Guess Ike is about to turn over.”9 If he did turn over, he...

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