Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith

19. “Allies Are Very Difficult People to Fight With”

387  19  “Allies Are Very Difficult People to Fight With” The logic that dictated the decision to embark on operations in North Africa in 1942 still held for the Mediterranean in 1943. Torch offered the only opportunity to employ Anglo-American power that had any likelihood of producing significant strategic and political gains without hazarding a catastrophic defeat. Hitler’s decision to prop up Italy was drawing Germany down a strategic dead end; the Allied strategy was opportunistic, to be sure, and it would have been an enormous mistake not to exploit the potential dividends left dangling in the Mediterranean by German strategic blundering. And the Americans—with their own chiefs of staff divided—offered no better alternative. Strategy in the Mediterranean took on an irresistible inertia: Torch magnified El Alamein, Tunisia led to Sicily, and Sicily led to Italy. Although the Mediterranean presented no possibilities for inflicting a decisive defeat on Germany—attrition campaigns are never decisive—the “grind down” theory held out the promise of tying down and eroding German strength, breaking the Axis coalition, and enlivening resistance movements everywhere —all crucial precursors for a successful return to France in 1944. As Eisenhower concluded, he did not “see how the ‘big bosses’ could have deviated very far from the general course of action they adopted” at Casablanca.1 The roadblock remained Tunisia—the bridge to Sicily and Italy. The Desert Fox had learned a very hard lesson at great cost: “the battle,” said Rommel, “is fought and decided by the quartermasters before the shooting begins.”2 If that were true, the chaotic state of American logistics guaranteed the Allies’ loss of the first rounds in Tunisia. Eisenhower ordered Anderson not to think in terms of a brigade here and a brigade 388  BEETLE there but rather to concentrate his forces. Anderson failed for two reasons . Throughout January, the German commander in the north, GEN Hans-Jürgen von Arnim, launched a series of limited offensives aimed at blocking Allied access to the passes through the Eastern Dorsals and the coastal plains beyond. Many of these attacks focused on the vulnerable French. Eisenhower ordered the French squeezed out of the line, extending the British First Army south and U.S. II Corps north, stretching the lines dangerously thin. Fredendall’s faulty deployments rendered a bad situation worse. The U.S. II Corps remained undermanned owing to the critical shortage of surface transportation. Until ASF made good on its pledge and expedited the shipment of trucks and railway equipment to North Africa, the patchwork deployment of Allied forces in Tunisia and the extemporized supply arrangements continued.3 Rommel and von Arnim took advantage of the end of the winter rains and the overextended Allied positions by launching a spoiling offensive in II Corps area. Eisenhower, touring the front, left Sidi Bou Zid only hours before two veteran panzer divisions rolled through. American units, “one packet at a time,” were overwhelmed. In the first days it appeared the Germans might roll up the entire Allied line, but stiffening resistance, difficult terrain, and divided German leadership forced the abandonment of the drive. While American losses in manpower , materiel, and confidence were high, the German offensive did not significantly alter the strategic situation. By 24 February, two days after the Germans pulled back, American forces reoccupied Kasserine Pass. Far more menacing, the fallout from Kasserine threatened to open a rift in the coalition. “Are We Allies or Aren’t We?” Eisenhower and Smith were away from Algiers when the Germans attacked. Smith went to Tripoli for a series of seminars and lectures presented by Montgomery on the lessons of desert fighting. Only three Americans attended the conference—Lee, Patton, and Smith. Montgomery could not help but notice that not a single general officer outside Eighth Army showed up, but Anderson’s people had a good reason— they were in combat. Always a keen student of military history, Smith jumped at the chance to meet the “Victor of Alamein” and listen to his “lessons learnt.” Just as important, he wanted to cement an association with the general who, in a few days, would command an army under AFHQ, albeit indirectly through Alexander. Naturally, Smith knew all “Allies Are Very Difficult People to Fight With” 389 about Montgomery’s personality quirks from his British friends, such as how he liked to go his own way and was exceedingly hard to manage. Montgomery gave...