The 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam: Unparalleled and Unequaled

Chapter 8: Post–Dong Xuan Operations

Post–Dong Xuan Operations The aggressive actions of the RVNAF and the 9th Division in the Delta and U.S. forces and our Allies elsewhere in South Vietnam forced the Communist leaders to abort their Winter-Spring Offensive. Yet, the dispersed and elusive Viet Cong and NVA units that remained in the Upper Delta still had a limited capability to attack population centers and military installations if they were permitted to concentrate forces. We saw how, after the beating they took in the February 1968 Tet Offensive , the Viet Cong were able to mass and attack Saigon again in May. Even after the Mini-Tet losses, they attempted another highpoint in Long An in August and September. Consequently, to prevent yet another Communist attempt at a highpoint and to permit the GVN pacification program to progress, it was necessary for the division to continue to aggressively locate and destroy enemy local and main force units. Unrelenting Pressure Maj. Gen. Harris W. Hollis followed Maj. Gen. Julian J. Ewell as the fourth commanding general of the 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam. Under his outstanding leadership, the 9th Division continued to apply unrelenting pressure, night and day, on the enemy. The large Viet Cong losses diluted the Communist leadership, replacements were not as well trained or experienced, the enemy’s resupply of weapons and ammunition was being interdicted and the people rallying to the GVN reduced his food supply. As the Viet Cong capabilities weakened, ours strengthened. In April and May, the 9th Division continued to operate full-bore and eliminated more than six thousand enemy (see table 14). The net result was that the Viet Cong Infrastructure eroded and pacification greatly improved. During April and May, seven different main Chapter 8 138 The 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam force Viet Cong and NVA units were tracked down, surrounded, and defeated, keeping the enemy off balance and denying him any offensive capabilities.1 These large battles were very important in preempting the Communist offensive operations by destroying and capturing the enemy. However , the pay-off was the result of unprecedented thousands of small-unit operations applying constant pressure, causing the Viet Cong structure to fall apart. The Communists lost their leaders, their followers, their weapons and ammunition, and their food. They were ineffective and on the run, unable to mount an offensive. The dedication and bravery of all the 9th Division soldiers was the key to this success. The torrid pace of the offensive operations went on, insuring a constant twenty-four-hour pressure on the enemy. From 27 March to 26 April 1969, over 3,000 VC were eliminated, about three per contact (see table 18). In our efforts to cover the large tactical area in order to interdict the enemy, there were 2,452 operations where no contact was made. However, those operations often paid off in other ways, such as enabling units like the 3rd Brigade to discover enemy caches. While conducting operations, the men of the 3rd Brigade uncovered a huge enemy cache containing 128 60 mm mortar rounds, 37,000 AK-47 rounds, fifty boxes of 60mm fuses, fifty-two cans of 60mm charges, thirtyeight anti-tank grenades, and 296 82 mm mortar rounds. Table 17. Major Unit Contacts, April and May 1969 Date Enemy unit Enemy losses 8 April K-4 Battalion 42 NVA KIA 18 April K-5 Battalion 31 NVA KIA 26 April K-6 Battalion 63 NVA KIA 10 May 580th Battalion 49 VC KIA 13 May 267th Battalion 83 VC KIA 14 May K-4 Battalion 30 NCA KIA 22 May 261th Artillery 105 VC KIA 24 May 516th Battalion 90 VC KIA Source: 9th Infantry Division field reports, April and May 1969. Post–Dong Xuan Operations 139 During the first five months of 1969, the 9th Division, in coordination with its Vietnamese allies, preempted all efforts by the Communists to implement their Winter-Spring Offensive, requiring them to abort their plans. During the five-month period, the division eliminated 13,264 enemy, of which 4,604 were the result of highly successful night operations, which restricted the Viet Cong’s ability to move under the cover of darkness (see table 14). Within that number, 539 POWs were captured, 249 Hoi Chanhs rallied to U.S. troops, and 87 members of the Viet Cong infrastructure were held as civil defendants. Additionally , 3,030 Viet Cong within the division area rallied...