The 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam: Unparalleled and Unequaled

Chapter 3: Enhancing Combat Capabilities

Enhancing Combat Capabilities In mid-May 1968, the 9th Division found itself still responsible for a huge tactical area of responsibility that included all or parts of eight Vietnamese provinces. The division headquarters was split between Bearcat and Dong Tam, with the majority of divisional support troops and several combat battalions located at Bearcat, which was several hours by road from Dong Tam and required traveling through the builtup areas of Saigon. Also, higher headquarters had directed the division to assume several static defensive ground missions, such as defending a key signal relay site, protecting the major petroleum tank farm, and protecting highways and key bridges. The huge perimeter of Dong Tam had to be guarded while construction was ongoing. Not only that, but in combating the two phases of the VC/NVA General Offensive (Tet and Mini-Tet), the 9th Division combat units had suffered 4,458 casualties overall, which had not been totally replaced. All of the above was sapping the division’s ability to perform offensive operations. The result at the time was that the infantry companies operated offensively about 50 percent of the time, with an average strength of about eighty riflemen in the field. Consequently, there were only about a thousand infantrymen operating on a daily basis. After Mini-Tet, with the Viet Cong in the Delta highly dispersed in their base areas avoiding contact, it was going to take all the division ’s resources to literally beat the bushes to locate and defeat the enemy. To that end, the division required every available infantryman operating in the paddies. It was obvious what had to be done for the division to build upon its experience to date and sharpen its combat edge. Consequently, the division initiated two important, concurrent efforts to enhance its operational capabilities. The first was to ensure that the maximum number of well-supported, healthy infantrymen were Chapter 3 Enhancing Combat Capabilities 23 available and utilized on daily combat operations. The second was to fine-tune and adjust techniques and tactics to make U.S. infantrymen as efficient as possible in the performance of operations by attriting the enemy while insuring the safety and well-being of U.S. troops. Accomplishing these two efforts to enhance combat operations entailed deliberate, iterative procedures that required much analysis and many trials. It took over eight months for the division’s operational effectiveness to peak, which it did in the period following January 1969, during the IV Corps Dry Weather Campaign, whose objective was to make an all-out push during the dry season in the Delta to crush the Communist insurgency and accelerate pacification. What follows is a discussion of the many steps taken to enhance the combat capabilities of the 9th Infantry Division. Optimizing the Availability of the Infantry Soldier The primary asset of an infantry division is the infantryman himself. He is the cutting edge. Therefore, the initial concentration was to take those steps necessary to have the maximum number of well-supported, healthy infantry soldiers operating in the rice paddies on a daily basis. There were never enough infantrymen to perform all the tasks in such a large area of responsibility, so the division had to optimize the availability of this vital asset. This called for two things: first, to have the maximum number of infantry companies operating offensively on a daily basis, and, second, to have those operating companies with a full complement of healthy infantrymen. That required several organizational enhancements and unit management and personnel actions. Organizational Enhancements Several organizational changes that would materially increase the number of infantry rifle companies in the division were ongoing or planned. The 9th Infantry Division rotated to Vietnam with seven infantry battalions, two mechanized battalions, and an armored cavalry squadron. With the division programmed to operate in the Delta, it was questionable whether the mechanized units would be effective in the inundated terrain. In early 1968, the cavalry squadron, the 3rd Squadron/5th Cavalry, was ordered to northern I Corps near the De- 24 The 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam militarized Zone (DMZ) to provide more armored capability because of the sizeable enemy armored threat in the vicinity. Happily, the cavalry squadron’s air cavalry troop and its vital helicopter assets remained with the division. Shortly thereafter, perhaps because of the transfer of the 3rd Squadron/5th Cavalry, a new four-company rifle battalion, the 6th Battalion/31st Infantry, was...