Black Power in the Caribbean

11. Black Power, Popular Revolt, and Decolonization in the Dutch Caribbean

11 Black Power, Popular Revolt, and Decolonization in the Dutch Caribbean GERT OOSTINDIE Two crucial moments in the history of the decolonization of the Dutch Caribbean lie at the heart of this chapter. On 30 May 1969, black rioters set fire to the city center of Willemstad, Curaçao, bearing such slogans as “Nos lo sinja nan respeta nos” (“We will teach them to respect us”). On 25 November 1975, Suriname became an independent republic, a triumph for the overwhelmingly Afro-Surinamese coalition government. Ideals of AfroCaribbean liberation certainly contributed to both events, and, in hindsight , connections can be drawn between the Curaçao disturbances and the achievement of independence in Suriname. However, this relationship does not conform to a simple heroic narrative of emancipatory Black Power in the Dutch Caribbean. This chapter opens with a summary of Dutch decolonization policies in the Caribbean, followed by an analysis of the state of affairs in Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles in the late 1960s, including the position of the Afro-Caribbean population in the two countries. The next part details the dramatic events of the May 1969 revolt in Curaçao. The closing sections offer some observations on the long-term legacy of this revolt for the constitutional development of the transatlantic Kingdom of the Netherlands and for Afro-Caribbean empowerment in the former Dutch colonies.1 Dutch Decolonization Policies in the Caribbean and the 1954 Statuut The core of Dutch colonialism was not situated in the Caribbean, but in the Dutch East Indies. Here classical colonialism—based on economic and geo- Gert Oostindie 240 political interests combined with administrative zeal—was abruptly ended through a classical decolonization struggle marked by bloody battles and protracted negotiations, subsequently poisoning postcolonial relations. Within just seven years—framed by the Japanese occupation in 1942, the unilateral proclamation of independence in 1945, and the transfer of sovereignty in 1949—the Netherlands lost the Dutch East Indies, which were, many thought, both the cork that kept the Dutch economy afloat and the Dutch ticket to being a serious political player on the world stage.2 In the end, the loss of Indonesia did not turn into an economic drama, but it did indeed reduce the Netherlands’ significance in the international political arena. Concurrent with this arduous process, the Hague developed a decolonization policy for its Caribbean colonies. The outcome was the Statuut, or Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, proclaimed in 1954. The charter defined the kingdom as a voluntary relationship between three equal and internally autonomous countries: the Netherlands, Suriname, and the six Caribbean islands that formed the Netherlands Antilles. This definition of the relationship between the metropolis and its former colonies represented a middle path between two extremes that were not seriously discussed at the time by any of the partners involved: full sovereignty for the former Caribbean colonies or, conversely, complete integration into the metropolis as provinces. As the charter’s preamble stated, the three countries would “take care of their own interests autonomously, manage communal affairs on an equal footing, and accord each other assistance.”3 The charter defined foreign policy, defense, citizenship, and the safeguarding of a proper governmental administration as matters of common interest to be governed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This kingdom government was simply delineated as the ruling Dutch cabinet expanded to include one plenipotentiary minister for each of the two Caribbean territories. The initial idea to inaugurate a kingdom parliament to which this expanded government would be accountable was eventually abandoned by all parties. At some point during the long-winded negotiations, all parties agreed that this structure would be too complicated and place too much strain on the limited Caribbean political and administrative elites. The simpler variation was chosen for pragmatic reasons, thereby producing the democratic deficit of a kingdom government without a corresponding kingdom parliament. The charter rested on notions of “equality” and “reciprocal assistance,” which, because of the asymmetrical balance of power, were (and are) utterly fictitious. This was already obvious in 1954. The initial formulas were not, in Black Power, Popular Revolt, and Decolonization in the Dutch Caribbean 241 fact, invented with a view to Caribbean decolonization, but during World War II by the Dutch cabinet in exile in London in the hope of convincing the Indonesian nationalists to remain within a modernized postwar Kingdom of the Netherlands. When we consider the demographics, we find a double irony...