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6 The Jordanian Alliance with Syria In the aftermath of the October War, Jordan sought to capitalize on its (albeit limited) participation in the conflict as a means to re-enter the mainstream of Arab regional politics. One of the countries most receptive to Jordan’s attempt at inter-Arab reconciliation was Syria. Given the frequent bouts of hostility emanating from Damascus, which the Hashimite regime had come to regard as virtually routine, this reception seemed rather surprising . Yet Jordan’s period of inter-Arab isolation, from 1970 to 1973, had very quickly shifted in the post-war period to a steadily warming relationship with Syria.1 This chapter examines why Jordan shifted toward alliance and even economic integration with Syria, despite the two states’ long history of mutual antagonism. The long periods of Jordanian-Syrian hostility had been rooted in the politics of the Arab Cold War of the 1950s and 1960s. The Arab Cold War, which featured an inter-Arab struggle for power and influence, was an ideological conflict pitting conservative, pro-Western monarchies (such as Saudi Arabia , Kuwait, and Jordan) against more radical, revolutionary republics (such as Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria). The military officers-turned-presidents in these latter states were themselves often the result of various military coups d’etat that had toppled earlier conservative, pro-Western monarchies. But even within that broad regional dynamic, Jordan and Syria remained in many respects a classic study in opposites, as well as in rivalry.2 Jordan’s King Abdullah I had founded the kingdom with British support , while his grandson King Hussein had led the development of the modern Jordanian state, maintaining close ties to the United Kingdom and the United States. Hussein’s Jordan became the classic conservative monarchy with a foreign policy that was virulently anti-communist, moderate in its policies toward Israel, and an ally of Western powers. Syria, in contrast, remained fiercely anti-colonial and became virtually the archetype of the revolutionary republic, led by various colonels and generals following a succession of coups d’etat, until the 1970 coup brought Hafiz al-Asad to power. Asad changed the country’s image as a coup factory, establishing his own The Jordanian Alliance with Syria / 85 Ba'thist authoritarian regime and ruling until his death in 2000. While Jordan allied itself closely with the United States, Syria allied with the Soviet Union—and both countries relied heavily on the military and economic support of their superpower patrons. At both the global and regional levels, both countries had constructed identities that stood in contrast to one another.3 The Hashimite Kingdom was, of course, decidedly royalist, moderate in its foreign policy, cautious, and conservative. Syria was anti-monarchist, more militant in its foreign policy, revolutionary, and radical. These socially constructed images are held even today by many participants and observers of Middle East politics. But these images remain constructs from as early as the 1950s, and are today only partly accurate, and partly national stereotype. Still, for most of their modern histories, the two countries were often pitted against one another in various ways. And in terms of bilateral relations, both during the Nasir era and indeed long after the Arab Cold War, Jordan and Syria more often than not maintained a cold war of their own; and that is precisely why the Jordanian-Syrian alignment was so surprising. The alignment began with a flurry of meetings and diplomatic exchanges, which resulted first in a series of economic agreements and later evolved to include cooperation in security affairs as well. In March 1975 Jordanian Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i first broached the subject of closer JordanianSyrian relations in a visit to Damascus, where he met with President Asad. The very fact that Rifa'i had been appointed Prime Minister at this time, given his known Syrian connections and pro-Syrian views, made clear the Hashimite regime’s determination to develop stronger bilateral ties. The March 1975 meeting in Damascus produced a favorable and substantive response to Jordan’s overtures as both countries agreed to establish a joint committee to help coordinate the strengthening of their relationship.4 The Prime Minister’s successful trip to Damascus was quickly followed by an official state visit by King Hussein to the Syrian capital in April 1975. Once again, substantial progress was made, and the development of a Jordanian -Syrian alignment was well under way as the two heads of state signed a bilateral trade agreement. The momentum...

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