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12 Till It’s Over, Over There September 1918–April 1919 Aviation planning in the second half of 1918 proceeded with the belief that the war would last at least into 1919 and perhaps beyond. During the process, staff revisited old decisions and advanced new priorities based on the evolving situation at the front, over the ocean, and at factories and training fields in Europe and the United States. Advocates pushed for expanded initiatives, particularly in the area of land-based bombing. Not surprisingly, views held in Washington, Paris, and London frequently differed, often dramatically. To some degree, consultation with the Allies helped focus these efforts. At the same time a series of high-profile investigations led by Asst. Secretary Franklin D. Roosevelt, C-in-C Atlantic Fleet Henry Mayo, and Naval Constructor George Westervelt examined the vexatious issues of defective equipment/ aircraft and transportation deficiencies. Finally, in September and October , virtually all American stations under construction for so many months commenced wartime operations, albeit at lower than planned levels. Then, suddenly, just as the tempo of antisubmarine missions accelerated, the war ended, and the Navy hurriedly implemented policies to demobilize, dispose of equipment and bases, and bring the men home. Despite a late start and limited tactical results, naval aviation’s wartime growth and achievements laid the foundations for the emergence of a powerful new combat arm, one destined to play a crucial role in the decades ahead. * * * While day-to-day concerns at Paris headquarters in mid-1918 revolved around completing the construction of existing bases, assembling aircraft and motors , and carrying out daily missions, formulating plans for the 1919 campaign triggered additional strenuous efforts. At that moment few believed the war would end soon and all eyes focused on redoubling the aviation effort and implementing new strategies. Discussions actually began early in the year and 346 Stalking the U-Boat continued on an unofficial basis until midsummer when the process assumed greater urgency. Commander Dinger’s Intelligence and Planning Division in Paris, for example, analyzed a wide range of initiatives, including increasing the number of bombers carrying out missions across the North Sea and augmenting operations at Dunkirk or creating a new base north of Dover. The group also discussed establishing a patrol station near Belfast, a convoy station west of Lough Swilly, and another at the Lizard (Cornwall). Proposals for ramping up operations in France included assuming control of French bases at L’Orient and La Pallice, enlarging the station at Le Croisic, and opening a substation on Belle Ile. Other suggestions envisioned a patrol facility at Gibraltar and two in Portugal. None of these proposals advanced beyond the discussion stage, however, as the Navy strained to implement plans originally developed in 1917. Planning began in earnest later that summer. At the end of July, Hutch Cone cabled his principal commanders seeking suggestions in developing initiatives for the coming year. Their ideas formed the basis for high-level discussions held with the Allies in the next few months. Those polled included Edwards; Maxfield for LTA; Craven, head of operations at Paris headquarters; Callan, in charge of operations in Italy; and McCrary, commander of aviation stations in Ireland. Many earlier suggestions made by the Intelligence and Planning Division resurfaced for more detailed examination. Edwards advocated a greatly expanded aviation campaign, including assuming control of RAF stations near Land’s End while also utilizing 30 lighters originally acquired to facilitate the aerial assault on Heligoland to undertake patrols along the west coast of Ireland. The Admiralty, Twining, and Sims’s Planning Section agreed; and with a supply base located at Plymouth, this action would create an unbroken perimeter of bases from Lough Foyle in the north of Ireland to Arcachon near the Franco-Spanish border. Edwards also drew attention to the defensive nature of American actions in much of 1918 and recommended more offensive forays, particularly from the east coast of England against German naval bases, and from northeastern Italy against Austrian fleet installations. To carry out the latter mission he called for two new land plane bases in Italy and creation of a Southern Bombing Group, similar to the Northern Bombing Group. Edwards believed offensive activities required a 200 percent increase in NBG strength and 50 percent increases at Porto Corsini and Pescara. He realized that more land-based aviation resurrected the issue of amalgamation. If it did, so be it, for advantages to be derived from such activity more than outweighed the disadvantages.1 [3.133...

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