The Neoplatonic Socrates

Chapter 2. Plutarch and Apuleius on Socrates’ Daimonion

chapter 2 Plutarch and Apuleius on Socrates’ Daimonion John F. Finamore Introduction The topic of the nature of Socrates’daimonion found renewed interest in the Middle Platonic period. We are fortunate to possess two works from this period on Socrates’ personal daimon by Plutarch (c. 46–120 CE) and Apuleius (c. 125–c. 180 CE).1 Plato tells us that Socrates listened to a daimon, which he describes as a sort of voice that prevents Socrates from performing certain actions.2 In this chapter, I wish to examine how these Middle Platonic philosophers interpreted Socrates’ divine sign and in what context they made their investigation. First, however, we should consider the difference between the ancient and modern conception of the daimonion problem. In a recent book, various philosophers have considered the possible problems raised by the specter of Socrates’ divine inner voice.3 In the introduction to that volume, Smith and Woodruff summarize the issue involved as one between Socrates’ religious beliefs and his use of rationality and logic in his elenchus. They isolate three possible positions: the two sets of belief (religious and rational) are consistent with each other, Socrates’ religious beliefs trump his rational elenchus, or his rational argumentation trumps his religious beliefs.4 Authors in the anthology argue for one or the other of these three positions. It should be noted here that these philosophers are concerned with a matter of consistency: how to reconcile the two seemingly contradictory sides of Socrates’ personality. The reason that the question becomes framed this way is that the dominant philosophical position on Socrates in contemporary analysis pivots on the characterization of him as a purely rational thinker.5 The ancients came to the table with a different set of questions. There was no Plutarch and Apuleius 37 controversy about the existence of daimons, since evidence could be found in Plato’s dialogues: 1. Phaedo, 107d–108c: the daimon in charge of the deceased person’s soul guides it in Hades. 2. Symposium, 202d–203a: daimons act as intermediaries between gods and mortals. 3. Republic, 620d: each soul is allotted a guardian daimon to watch over it in life. 4. Phaedrus, 246e–247a: daimons follow along in the great circuit of the gods and souls in the heavens.6 5. Epinomis, 984b–985c: daimons dwell in the air, intermediary between gods and mortals. They feel affections, including love for good human beings and hate for evil ones. Thus the ancients had no problem with the concept of a daimon advising Socrates. Rather the question was how the daimon did so, what the nature of the daimon was (was it part of Socrates himself or separate from him?), and what did the fact that Socrates had a personal daimon say about Socrates as a philosophical role model for our lives? We know very little about what Platonists before Plutarch thought of the Socratic daimon. Xenocrates, third head of the Academy, believed that daimons were intermediary between gods and mortals (apud Plutarch, De Def. Or. 416cd) and that some daimons were evil (De Is. et Os. 361b).7 About the Socratic daimonion he is silent.8 The first Platonist to discuss the daimonion is Plutarch. Why were Plutarch and Apuleius interested in this Socratic daimon? Their interest, unlike that of modern scholars, centered on what they saw as Platonic demonology: where did the Socratic daimon fit into the hierarchy of gods, superior classes, and souls? They speculated about what this daimon might be, how it was related to other sorts of daimons (and, indeed, to souls and ghosts), why Socrates had a daimon, and what benefit he gained from it. Thus, through works on the daimonion authors could explore Platonic demonology, psychology, and eschatology . By examining Apuleius’s and Plutarch’s treatment of the Socratic daimonion, I hope to show how each framed the traditional elements of the daimonion story and thereby created his own unique perspective on the role of daimons and souls in Platonic philosophy. There seems to be a set of traditional topics that authors might choose to discuss:9 38 Chapter 2 1. Is the daimonion a voice? 2. Can it be seen? 3. Can the daimonion more naturally be described in some way, for example as snippets of overheard conversations or as a sneeze? 4. Is there a relationship between Socrates’ wisdom and his personal daimonion? 5. How does the daimonion fit into the demonological hierarchy...