-
6. A Rapidly Changing City
- University of Pennsylvania Press
- Chapter
- Additional Information
C h a p t e r 6 A Rapidly Changing City Pedro Pallan was a longtime Compton resident and businessperson. In December 1984, the Compton Unified board of trustees appointed Pallan to its personnel commission, a three-member board that oversaw the recruitment, screening, and hiring of approximately 1,900 classified employees. He became the first Latino to serve on the commission, when he replaced African American George Robinson. Ted Kimbrough, Compton Unified’s superintendent , applauded Pallan’s appointment, stating it showed Compton was “moving in a positive direction.”1 Despite Kimbrough’s optimistic declaration , the appointment did not portend a shift toward shared power or equal opportunities for blacks and Latinos. Instead, Pallan’s influence in hiring Latinos would remain limited as African Americans held tightly to the reins of Compton Unified. Pallan’s appointment reflected Compton’s changing demographics and black’s tokenism toward Latinos. In the 1980s, the ethnic composition of Compton and its school district changed from almost entirely African American to include a growing population of Latinos. This shift added new demands to an already troubled district, such as the operation of a bilingual program and the hiring of bilingual teachers. District officials, most of whom were black, resisted meeting the needs of the new Spanish-speaking Comptonites, because investing in bilingual programs and teachers would mean redistributing already scarce resources away from black teachers and students. Nationwide , African Americans historically depended on public-sector employment, including public schools, for economic opportunity and mobility because many white employers had blocked opportunities in the private sector.2 Not surprisingly, black educators, along with broad networks of organizations, ministers, and politicians, worked to “delay, derail, or diminish initiatives 152 Chapter 6 perceived to destabilize the historic economic role the school systems have played—and continue to play—in the black community.”3 District officials’ focus on education as a source of jobs distracted their approaching education as a fundamental civic obligation, a service they owed the community’s children regardless of their ethnicity. The district failed to meet the needs of both its Latino and black students. Compton Unified’s students continued to rank at the bottom of statewide tests while school officials continued to mismanage funds. The animosity between blacks and Latinos, the increasingly poor population, the statewide funding problems, the pressure of state-imposed standardized tests, and the lack of qualified teachers all took their toll on Comptonites’ aspirations. Redeveloping Compton The quest for local money through sales tax revenue grew out of Proposition 13, which capped local property taxes at 1 percent of their 1975 assessed value. As Compton staggered under continued financial strains, officials sought a variety of solutions. While some sought outside aid, officials also looked to bolster local resources. In the late 1970s and 1980s, consistent with the plans of many other American towns, from its neighboring inner-ring suburb Lynwood to small rustbelt cities like Omaha and Muncie to the country’s largest metropolis, New York City, Compton officials funded a series of redevelopment projects to enlarge the tax base and jumpstart the economy.4 Instead, the ill-chosen projects damaged the town’s already dwindling coffers, and cemented Compton’s negative image. The town found itself in a vicious cycle. In 1979, the federal government refused to guarantee a grant to Compton for its downtown’s development without private financial backing, but the town could not attract these nongovernmental funds without the federal grant. Local officials blamed the predicament on Compton’s being a “poor, black and extremely redlined community.”5 Compton appeared to be a bad investment. Losing the federal grant changed Comptonites’ strategy for improving the economy, though it did not squash Compton’s redevelopment plans. Shifting focus from the downtown, town leaders pinned much of their hope on the Alameda Auto Plaza, conceived as an “auto mall” that would halt the exodus of new car dealerships from the town. Planners designed the plaza to be in the southern part of town, right off the 91 Freeway, and the municipal [44.192.247.185] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 17:46 GMT) A Rapidly Changing City 153 redevelopment agency funded it because the agency expected it to generate up to $1 million a year in sales tax revenue. The town willingly invested its funds because, according to Lionel Cade, the mayor of Compton, the auto plaza would “effectively reverse economic deterioration.”6 From the beginning, the plaza faced numerous hurdles, not the least of which was...