Nonstate Actors in Intrastate Conflicts

Notes

N o t e s Introduction 1. On the domestic level, scholars have identified particular characteristics of states, especially outside the West (mainly in Africa and the Middle East), that underlie these conflicts, such as “state weakness,” “state failure,” and, in extreme cases, state disintegration . See Crocker 2003: 34–37; Fearon and Laitin 2003: 88; Posen 1993a: 34–35; Rotberg 2003, 2004; Saikal 2000: 39–45; Snyder and Bhavnani 2005: 567–73. For criticism of the “failed states” literature see Bilgin and Morton 2004: 169–70. For criticism of the concept of the intrastate “security dilemma” engendered by state disintegration see Roe 1999: 188–92. Research has also highlighted the role of armed organizations (or militias ), which are made up of members of various societal sectors (ethnic groups, clans, tribes, geographical regions, or ideological groups) who are mobilized before or during the conflict; see Mulaj 2010: 1–6; Ahram 2011: 7–24. On the international level, students of intrastate conflict have discussed the actual and potential role of outside forces, including the state’s immediate neighbors, other interested states, and regional and international organizations (UN, World Bank, etc.). See, e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 6–10; Howard 2008: 1–2. Whereas some observers have expressed support for external intervention in these conflicts, others are more skeptical—some going so far as to suggest that warring parties be allowed to reach equilibrium without foreign interference. On this debate, see the chapter by Barak and Sela in this volume. 2. See especially Thomson 1994: 3–4; Löwenheim 2007: 3–11. 3. See especially Jackson 1990: 21–26; Zacher 2001: 245. 4. It is worth adding that in cases when the latter type of actors arrive in the disrupted state one can, in fact, speak of “hybrid” domestic-external nonstate actors. There are, of course, other types of nonstate actors that can be mentioned in this context (e.g., crime organizations, NGOs), but these require separate treatment. 5. Such hypotheses have been raised by Kirschner 2009: 23–46 and Malet 2009: 53–58. 6. See http://davidmalet.com/The_Foreign_Fighter_Project.php, accessed June 21, 2012. 7. Malet 2009: 317 expresses reservations about coding the number of fighters 188 Notes to Pages 6–16 because, in his words, the natural source for these figures—the fighters themselves—is the source most prone to lying. 8. Fearon and Laitin 2003: 81, for instance, hypothesize that diasporas’ financial contributions, as well as aid from foreign governments, facilitate insurgencies. Due to issues of measurement, the authors do not test the hypothesis directly (82). 9. Woodwell 2004: 206–7 uses several data sources, including Vanhanen 1999; Gurr’s Minorities at Risk project (1999); CIA World Factbook 2000; and Grimes and Grimes Ethnologue 2001 to account for the influence of size of ethnic diasporas in neighboring countries on the likelihood of interstate—rather than intrastate—conflicts during the Cold War. We suggest extending the scope of both data collection and analysis. 10. See World Bank Page on migration and remittances, http://web.worldbank.org/ WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/0,contentMDK:21924020~pagePK:5105988~piPK:360 975~theSitePK:214971,00.html. 11. A more nuanced version of this measure could be used to examine whether stateless ethnic diasporas are more likely to be involved in homeland conflicts, an argument raised by Sheffer in his chapter in this volume. To do this, one would have to obtain information on stateless diaspora remittances to their state-aspiring communities in their desired homeland and compare it to other diasporas’ remittances. Obtaining it would require a more subtle examination of diaspora remittances by international bodies. 12. Noted examples are Herbert Kelman and Edward Azar, two leading American scholars specializing in intergroup conflicts who organized informal interactive workshops to promote a peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Israel/Palestine and Lebanon respectively. Chapter 1. The “Modern Sherwood Forest”: Theoretical and Practical Challenges 1. See Abrahms 2008: 96–101; Crenshaw 1988: 13–26, 1990: 10–20; Kydd and Walter 2002: 264–65; 2006: 50–51; McCormick 2003: 480–95; Pape 2003: 345–47, 2005: 20–24; Pedahzur and Perliger 2006: 1988–89; for critiques, see Mousseau 2002–2003: 5–6; Abrahms 2008: 82–93. 2. See Adamson 2006: 190–96; Crocker 2003: 34–37; Klare 2004: 117–25; Rabasa et al. 2007: xv–xix; Rotberg 2003: 5–6. Such a connection is mentioned in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America from September 2002: “Together with our European allies, we must help strengthen...