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8 Beyond Objectivism and Relativism OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM By "objectivism," I mean the basic conviction that there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or rightness. An objectivist claims that there is (or must be) such a matrix and that the primary task of the philosopher is to discover what it is and to support his or her claims to have discovered such a matrix with the strongest possible reasons. Objectivism is closely related to foundationalism and the search for an Archimedean point. The objectivist maintains that unless we can ground philosophy, knowledge, or language in a rigorous manner we cannot avoid radical skepticism. The relativist not only denies the positive claims of the objectivist but goes further. In its strongest form, relativism is the basic conviction that when we turn to the examination of those concepts that philosophers have taken to be the most fundamental-whether it is the concept of rationality, truth, reality, right, the good, or normswe are forced to recognize that in the final analysis all such concepts must be understood as relative to a specific conceptual scheme, theoretical framework, paradigm, form of life, society, or culture. Since the relativist believes that there is (or can be) a nonreducible plurality of such conceptual schemes, he or she challenges the claim that these concepts can have a determinate and univocal significance . For the relativist, there is no substantive overarching framework or single metalanguage by which we can rationally adjudicate or univocally evaluate competing claims of alternative paradigms. Thus, for example, when we turn to something as fundamental as the issue of criteria or standards of rationality, the relativist claims that we can never escape from the predicament of speaking of "our" and "their" standards of rationality-standards that may be "radically incommensurable." It is an illusion to think that there is something that might properly be labeled "the standards of rationality," standards that are genuinely universal and that are not subject to historical or temporal change. The agon between objectivists and relativists has been with us ever since the origins of Western philosophy, or at least from the time of Plato's attack on the Sophists and on Protagoras's alleged relativism. But it is only in recent times that the complex issues that this debate raises have become almost obsessive and have spread to every area of human inquiry and life. Despite the many novel twists and turns in this ancient debate, it has exhibited a remarkable conti- 9 An Overview nuity. Each time that an objectivist has come up with what he or she takes to be a firm foundation, an ontological grounding, a fixed categorial scheme, someone has challenged such claims and has argued that what is supposed to be fixed, eternal, ultimate, necessary, or indubitable is open to doubt and questioning. The relativist accuses the objectivist of mistaking what is at best historically or culturally stable for the eternal and permanent. When the objectivist claims to come up with clear and distinct criteria or foolproof transcendental arguments to support his or her claims, the relativist argues that close examination reveals that there is something fraudulent and ingenuous about such claims. But ever since Plato objectivists have argued that relativism, whenever it is clearly stated, is self-referentially inconsistent and paradoxical. For implicitly or explicitly, the relativist claims that his or her position is true, yet the relativist also insists that since truth is relative, what is taken as true may also be false. Consequently, relativism itself may be true and false. One cannot consistently state the case for relativism without undermining it. As so frequently happens in philosophy, the argument tends to shift from substantive claims about what are the proper foundations and how we know them to who has the burden of proof. Objectivists argue, rather like Dummett, that even though we can frankly recognize the failures of past philosophers, this is not a sufficient or even a good reason for thinking that we cannot discover the "proper object" of philosophy and a "systematic methodology" for making genuine progress. Because philosophers like Rorty and the edifying .thinkers that he admires see the trap of trying to prove that the objectivist is fundamentally mistaken, they employ a form of indirect communication and philosophic therapy that is intended to loosen the grip that objectivism has upon us-a therapy that seeks to liberate us from...

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