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Conclusion Taking issue with a Cramer Hill residents organization that was suing the city to prevent the reconstruction of its community, the CourierPost acknowledged the validity of its concerns about displacement, about designating good homes ‘‘blighted,’’ and about ‘‘the callousness of the process involved.’’ The paper pointed, however, to the project’s potential in tax ratables and for ‘‘effecting economic revival.’’ Camden’s chief executive, the paper asserted, ‘‘cares about the homeowners.’’ But his concern was greater. ‘‘The committee is trying to save homes and he is trying to save a city.’’1 The project in question was not Cherokee Investment’s, but a proposal from a Philadelphia developer to create a new ‘‘City Within a City.’’ The executive was Al Pierce, not Randy Primas. The year was , and yet almost forty years later history seemed to be repeating itself. Could so little have changed? In fact, over a generation much had changed, both in Camden and nationally. After reaching new heights of commitment to addressing urban problems in the s, the federal government had virtually abandoned any effort to reverse the fortunes of cities besieged by social and economic restructuring . Because even the most liberal challenges to concentrated poverty had been fleeting and inadequate, activists had few foundations to build on. As influence over policy affecting their lives shifted to the states and, increasingly, to the private sector, they were forced to adapt. As a consequence , black militance no longer presented the chief challenge to privately induced development and redevelopment. African Americans took a more pragmatic turn, and in this Randy Primas could be described as only a little ahead of his time. By the late twentieth century even black critics were embracing revenue-building strategies over the more ideologically driven social welfare practices embraced by the first generation of black bigcity mayors.2 Neighborhood-based organizations, deprived of federal subsidies available only briefly during the Great Society, adjusted as well. They became less ideological and willing to form partnerships with the private sector themselves. Their most important legacy, community development Conclusion  corporations, Robert Halpern reports, proved ‘‘to be a relatively flexible and enduring strategy,’’ capable of attracting capital back to inner city neighborhoods and demonstrating ‘‘how investment can address social as well as individual needs.’’3 Pragmatism had its rewards. Despite the lack of federal funding available for urban renewal, community as well as downtown organizations found new ways to attract new investment. These successes prompted the optimistic view at the start of the new century that the nation’s postindustrial cities were experiencing renewal at last. In one city after another —Cleveland with its waterfront development including the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, Newark with its performing arts center, Trenton with construction of a new hotel complex—such investments were considered sure signs that prosperity would ripple through the city as a whole. Supporters of New Jersey’s recovery legislation for Camden spoke confidently of adding the city to the list of ‘‘comeback cities.’’ Both by creating funds to leverage private investment and by concentrating power in the position of the Chief Operating Officer over management as well as redevelopment, they hoped to overcome decades of inaction and ineptitude. For Camden, as for other cities David Rusk has labeled ‘‘beyond the point of no return,’’ such hopes, to date, have proved illusory. Even as modern physical improvements have helped banish entrenched images of decline and decay, they have failed to alter the position that left these older cities—downtown as well as in their neighborhoods—weakened elements in their larger metropolitan regions. The changes at hand have not been sufficient either to restore central cities to the primacy they once had or to materially lift the fortunes of their residents. As David Perry points out, citing Buffalo’s experience, once corporate ownership locates outside a city and that city’s resources fail to attract capital investment on its own, such areas require increasingly generous public subsidies. The worse the situation , the more expansive the incentive offered to private investors. ‘‘Indeed ,’’ Perry writes, ‘‘most forms of economic development policy and planning deliberately eschew any direct distributional or equity issues. The conditions of deindustrialization and economic distress are viewed as evidence in the United States of a lack of attention to the needs of capital. Profit, and not equity, is the issue of the day in contemporary urban America.’’4 Not surprisingly, Camden followed the same trajectory in its recovery efforts. To...

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