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CHAPTER TWO Terms of Endearment Though [Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill] had their differences ... they caredpassionately about the same overarching truth: breaking the Axis. They also shared the conviction that they were destined to play these roles. A friendship like Roosevelt and Churchill's is rightly understood as afond relationship in which two people have an interest notjust in each other ... but also ... in a shared external truth or mission. "The primary duty ofa Britishprime minister is to get on with the U.S. president, "Margaret Thatcher told Tony Blair at theirfirst meeting following his election. "The British-US relationship is unique,"said President George W. Bush in january 2006, ''and I'm convinced it will be unique in thefuture, for the good ofthe world. "' THROUGHOUT THE PREWAR debate over Iraq, the clash between George W. Bush and Jacques Chirac-between the United States and Franceprovided for the most significant crisis in transatlantic relations since the debates over Germany's rearmament and the Suez crisis fifty years earlier. That was not all, however. Britain and Prime Minister Tony Blair were equally central to that debate-a country whose identity was fundamentally built away from Europe and a prime minister whose decisions were influenced by the close personal relationship he developed with the president of the United States. Terms of Endearment 47 By comparison, no such levels of intimacy or even cooperation could ever be achieved between France and Britain, or between their respective leaders. Mitterrand, wrote Margaret Thatcher, "was really not quite sure whether it was easier to deal with [her] when she was difficult or when she was cheerful." Thatcher claims she "liked both" Mitterrand and Chirac, but her portraits ofeither man make this claim hardly convincing, which may be why Thatcher herself found her fondness for them somewhat "odd."2 So it has always been, whether with de Gaulle during and after World War II, or with Raymond Poincare during and after World War J.3 Repeatedly, it seems, the Anglo-French rivalry defined the history ofEurope even after they signed a supposedly "cordial" alliance, which they modestly (and realistically) dubbed an entente, early in the twentieth century. The divide exacerbates France's estrangement from the United States as its supposedly "European" view of Europe (also labeled, presumably distastefully, Gaullist) clashes with a view that de Gaulle used to describe dismissively as Anglo-Saxon, meaning, principally, Anglo-American. The contrast between these views is exaggerated. As we have seen, there is less divergence in U.S.-French relations than meets the ear, and as will be seen, there is more convergence in Anglo-French relations than meets the eye. Yet there is truth in the idea that Britain traditionally has sought to influence while France has wanted to induce and that Britain's influence has relied on an ability to convince or even manipulate while France's inducement has depended on its ability to coerce or merely obstruct. The British attitude is firmly entrenched in a long-standing beliefin the role of mediateur: an assumption that "jaw-jaw is better than war-war," as Winston Churchill liked to put it. By comparison, the French attitude is deeply rooted in an aversion to the role of demandeur; a position that is reflective of a weakness that invites dependence and prevents the needed renewal.4 Where the French tend to argue forcefully-in bold characters and with exclamation marksthe British tend to reason more gently, in italics and with question marks. In attempting to manage their quarrelsome people, the French government's attempts to assert leadership forcefully from the top down often degenerate into endless theological arguments. The lingering cliches of the country's history provide a shortcut to France's rationality: one Frenchman shall produce a king; two Frenchmen, an argument; and three Frenchmen, a revolution . For Britain, the reverse is true. In London, as a matter of tradition but in the absence ofconstitutional matter, there is a willingness to follow, before there can be a will to compete or a demonstrable capacity to lead. The cliche 0.188.16] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 09:56 GMT) 48 CHAPTER TWO is predictably different: one Englishman, it is expected, will produce a model of courtesy; two Englishmen, a model of fair play; and three Englishmen, an imperial model.5 Such characterizations are admittedly simplistic and even a bit tasteless, but they can nonetheless help explain the differences that have kept Britain and the United States separate from France...

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