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Preface Critics around the world condemn privileged lawyers as arrogant, greedy, manipulative, and self-serving. The stereotype does not fit the International Commission of Jurists (IC]), an organization of human rights lawyers based in Geneva, Switzerland. While its members and staff would never be faulted for excessive humility, their pride arises from a lofty commitment to the rule of law rather than from winning immense monetary judgments. Like ambitious Davids confronting Goliath, the self-selected IC] judges, law professors, and practicing attorneys have challenged a state system whose sovereign governments choose to be a law unto themselves. Their goal is to create a new, international political and legal order that prevents historically sovereign governments from kidnapping, torture, murder, and arbitrary detention. An exclusive professional elite motivated by noble ideals has campaigned for universal democratic principles. This book presents a five-part history of the Ie] from 1952 to mid1993 as a case study of political science and legal theories about interest groups in a changing world. Part I describes how the IC] began in response to Stalinist totalitarianism.' The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covertly arranged an inaugural conference in Berlin to counter the Soviet-controlled International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL). The CIA supported more than two hundred organizations through foundations that most recipients believed were privately funded. Unaware of any CIA connection, lawyers recruited "free world" jurists for an IC] that proclaimed the rule of law and denounced "socialist legality." A small governing Commission of elite judges, scholars, and practicing lawyers hired a SecretaryGeneral to direct a permanent staff. Part II details how a new Secretary-General in 1956 and superpower rivalry in the third world led the IC] to attack fascism and apartheid as well as the dictatorship of the proletariat. Highly publicized and well-attended congresses on the rule of law in New Delhi, xlv Preface Lagos, and Rio de Janeiro created a global network of members in thirty-four national sections. The ICJ defined universal rule of law principles obligating all states to honor both procedural and substantive rights. ICJ activists then initiated enforcement tactics involving trial observers, country reports, negative publicity, and inquiry committees. Balanced criticism directed at noncommunist dictators in Spain and South Africa improved the ICJ's reputation for impartiality . Partisan anticommunism compromised major inquiries on China and Cuba. Part III examines how Secretary-General Sean MacBride reoriented the ICJ after 1963. A confirmed internationalist, MacBride fashioned a coalition of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that linked the East and the West, the IADL and the IC]. In a worldwide campaign, the NGOs called for a U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights and Geneva Convention protocols to improve humanitarian law. The IC] also attempted to protect individual victims through quiet diplomacy, trial observers, fact-finding missions and publications, and interventions with international organizations and national foreign policy makers. MacBride's pioneering campaign for global citizenship rights produced successes and failures that guided other NGOs. Public disclosure brought an end to covert CIA funding in 1967. Soviet bloc and third world tyrants embarrassed by IC] publicity sought to revoke U.N. consultative status for the U.S.-funded group. Other third world governments appreciated that MacBride had applied a nonpartisan approach that also shamed pro-Western dictators. Suspicions always lingered about the early years, but until this study there has been no full accounting of CIA involvement. The ICJ retained its good reputation and U.N. consultative status but lost most of its income. The Ford Foundation provided an interim grant and then recommended that the IC] wind up operations in 1970. Drastic retrenchment and MacBride's departure left the IC] leaderless and without funds. MacBride shifted his energies to Amnesty International , which grew rapidly through mass membership organizing efforts and a world campaign against torture. Part IV covers the twenty-year tenure of Secretary-General Niall MacDermot. European government grants saved the IC] from bankruptcy , and a scaled-down program achieved remarkable impact. Observers typically rank the IC] as among the most influential and respected human rights NGOs. The Ie] won the first European Human Rights Prize in 1980, the Wateler Peace Prize in 1988, and the Erasmus Prize in 1989. MacDermot directed a three-part campaign of promotion, standard setting, and protection activities. Chapter 7 [18.117.81.240] Project MUSE (2024-04-19 03:21 GMT) Preface xv describes how the IC] adapted classical liberal ideology to promote human rights in one-party and developing states. As the Association of...

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