The International Commission of Jurists: Global Advocates for Human Rights

4. Protecting Victims

Chapter 4 Protecting Victims "No, no!" said the Queen. "Sentence first-verdict afterwards." "Stuff and Nonsense!" said Alice. -Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland Between 1956 and 1963 the IC] developed independent authority to investigate violations, judge governments' guilt, and publicly condemn their crimes. Traditionally, states alone enforced international law with diplomatic or military means, and governments recognized few customary rules beyond formal treaty obligations. Over the past century states have gradually allowed intergovernmental organizations more lawmaking and enforcement functions. Inadequate protection by states and the League of Nations failed the millions victimized by genocide and aggression in the 1940s. Idealists envisioned a postwar order in which international NGOs could put wayward governments in the dock. IC] advocates pressed the United Nations to implement new law and developed outside enforcement strategies to protect victims. To enforce human rights law, the IC] brought state criminals to the court of world public opinion. Because the primitive international legal system lacked prosecutors, the jurists performed like private attorneys general indicting state felons.' In the absence of international courts with compulsory jurisdiction over recalcitrant states, IC] experts rendered judgments based on independent investigations. When no intergovernmental organization would compel obedience to the rule of law, the Commission punished offenders with negative 80 Chapter 4 publicity. All governments fell short of the ideal, but their failings ranged from negligence, through petty offenses, to heinous crimes against humanity. The IC]'s varied responses ranged from exhortation to denunciation, from quiet diplomacy to negative publicity , from lobbying wayward governments to appealing for U.N. condemnation. Suasion, unlike coercion, requires moral and professional authority untainted by political bias. The IC] claimed its authority from eminent membership and staff, national sections in over thirty countries, and as many as forty thousand professional supporters committed to the rule of law. State representatives typically shield allies and skewer adversaries. In selecting targets and methods, the IC] avoided the double standard of U.N. member governments but still appeared somewhat partisan." The jurists exhorted many governments, including their own; condemned totalitarianism but not colonialism; and waged their most intensive campaigns against the USSR and China. The major tactics included trial observers, country reports, public protests, and inquiry committees. Trial Observers At Delhi the IC] had proclaimed a fundamental right to fair trial. Political trials rather than routine criminal proceedings became the first concern. From its origins, the Ie] condemned trials that were rigged to eliminate political enemies. Under some regimes, emergency laws retroactively criminalized and enhanced penalties for the opposition's prior acts. To assure conviction, governments created special courts with servile judges. Unrepresented traitors convicted in secret proceedings and unable to appeal their sentences were promptly executed. Successful coup leaders prosecuted and executed their ousted rivals. Some regimes welcomed observers to confer legitimacy on show trials. Rule of law objections to such summary justice threaten tyrants' primary goal-to retain power. As an international NGO, the IC] would not dispatch lawyers or find local counsel to represent political defendants in different local jurisdictions," Without openly contesting governments' authority to punish criminals, the IC] sent trial observers to impress on judges and counsel their obligation to proceed fairly. Governments, NGOs, and journalists had all set precedent by sending observers to political trials. Idealists wanted a customary rule of international law that required states to admit observers.' The IC] advanced that emerging norm by overcoming initial state resistance and routinely sending "trial observers to many different countries. Protecting Victims 81 To pressure governments for admission, the IC] publicized each formal request to send observers and protested any denial. The press cooperated by identifying four communist governments that refused visas for IC] missions." Ceylon's justice minister objected in the press to Munro's public request, but still admitted a Canadian IC] trial observer . Poland's denial was followed by an invitation to other purportedly impartial observers. Governments that excluded observers did not escape censure, as the Bulletin used independent sources to expose unfair proceedings. The IC] had easiest access in countries where its leaders had visited officials and organized sections. By 1962 seven governments in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia had admitted IC] mission's. The observers must have disappointed rulers who hoped the IC] would confer legitimacy on their quasilegal efforts to eliminate political enemies. Firsthand Bulletin reports from Turkey, Ethiopia, and Dahomey criticized grave procedural irregularities. Instead of sending staff as observers, the IC] recruited volunteer...