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Conclusion Identities, Interests, and Human Rights Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an upsurge in identity and cultural politics. In much of the post–Cold War debate about culture, Islam has presented a particular challenge to some aspects of Western modernity.1 As Islam has come under closer scrutiny in the post-9/11 period, young Muslims have sought to learn more about their religion and strengthen their sense of identity.2 More specifically, since the March 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States, the culture of resistance has found its place throughout the Middle East. Hizbollah’s victory declaration following the Israeli offensive in southern Lebanon in summer 2006 has also become an important turning point not only for the Shia, but also for the Sunnis in Egypt, where Hizbollah is famous and Nasrallah, the leader of Lebanese Shiites , has become a hero.3 Some Middle Eastern politicians see the revival of the identity issue as a result of the democratization process. Abdullah Gul, Turkey’s president, argues that ‘‘as Muslim societies democratize, you will see greater religious expression everywhere in society. It is a consequence of democracy. People in Muslim countries are devout and socially conservative. You cannot fight against this. You have to understand it and allow some expression of this belief.’’4 Others hold the view that opposition to globalization is reflected in the religious beliefs and practices of Muslims. Significantly, religion has helped humans deal with uncertainty and fear while giving meaning and organization to the behavior of individuals, families, and groups in global society.5 To fully understand identity politics in the Muslim world, we must place it in both its conceptual and historical contexts. Several factors have led to the formation of a new Islamic identity for Muslims in the past half century. The reawakening of an Islamic consciousness has been facilitated largely by mass education and mass communication. The latter has been greatly facilitated by the revolution in information technology and the Internet. Non-  Conclusion state actors, market forces, and satellite technology have affected collective identities in the Muslim world.6 Additionally, the persistence of authoritarian governments throughout the Muslim world, as well as the unresolved status of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, helps to explain the resurgent enthusiasm for Islam throughout the Muslim world.7 The humiliating Arab defeat by the Israelis in the 1967 SixDay War dealt a severe blow to Arab nationalism/socialism and gave rise to Islamic fundamentalism. More recently, anger and resentment toward the occupation of Iraq, along with the shame caused by the mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners, have incited a new cycle of hatred among Muslims that has only emboldened Islamic extremism. Using Islam as grassroots counterhegemony , militant Islamic groups have energized an insurgency capable of disrupting Iraq’s postwar reconstruction. To many experts, Islamic radicalism was born as a reaction to the decline of Muslim power.8 To others, Islamic militancy is a nuanced and subtle backlash against foreign interference, as many in the Muslim world seek to define and forge new identities and paths for their future.9 To still others, Islamic radicals are bent on promoting the discourse of opposition, which is increasingly antidemocratic, illiberal, and, in social and economic terms, regressive.10 It was such an Islamic extremist who assassinated former prime minister Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007, in an attempt to plunge Pakistan into political chaos, civil war, or an internally led Islamist army coup.11 Some observers have favored including moderate Islamists in elections and the political process. The examples of Islamist participation in open elections in Jordan, Kuwait, and Lebanon, they assert, illustrate governments ’ willingness to play by the rules, at least while these groups are in the minority. More specifically, the process of inclusion promotes pragmatism and moderation. Inclusionary politics tend to reduce militancy.12 It can also be argued that the political inclusion of Islamist parties may or may not lead to their ideological and political moderation. In Jordan, inclusion has prompted ideological moderation of the Islamist party, but this has not been the case in Yemen. Different experiences in Jordan and Yemen can be attributed to structural changes in public political space, internal group structures, and the creation of new ideas and narratives governing political practice. In Jordan, for instance, the regime could rely on a longer history of participatory politics to strengthen democracy and national unity. In both cases, however , there is also skepticism about the possibility that Islamists can...

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