A Predictable Tragedy: Robert Mugabe and the Collapse of Zimbabwe

7. The State Bourgeoisie and the Plunder of the Economy

C h a p t e r 7 The State Bourgeoisie and the Plunder of the Economy It is difficult to reconcile Stephen Chan’s recollection of the simple lifestyle in 1980 of Teurai Ropa (Joyce Mujuru) and her husband Rex Nhongo (General Solomon Mujuru)1 and their current position as prominent businesspeople.2 In their own way they exemplify the success of the ZANU-PF elite. In the early literature on Zimbabwe great emphasis is put on the nationalist/socialist project carried by both guerrilla movements (‘‘pro-Russian’’ ZAPU and ‘‘pro-Chinese’’ ZANU), and a great deal of intellectual debate focused in the 1980s on whether or not ZANU-PF had engaged Zimbabwe on the path of a socialist revolution. Most observers then took at face value the black nationalist elite’s ostentatious revolutionary commitment and egalitarian ethos.3 That ruling party leaders genuinely sought socioeconomic development and the welfare of the masses, as illustrated by the high levels of public spending in health and education, was a rarely questioned creed. It was largely assumed that Zimbabwe would not fall in postcolonial Africa’s common predicament: political elites’ predatory behavior backed by a variable degree of authoritarian rule. If the matter was still debatable, perhaps, in the late 1990s, when corruption became ominous in several economic sectors, though not generalized to all, there must be a consensus today that the ruling ZANU-PF mafia and its crony capitalists are busy looting what is left of the national assets. Zimbabwe’s ranking in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index fell from 43rd in 1998 to 65th in 2000 and 166th in 2008. Extortion is part of everyday survival strategies, including at police roadblocks. No compelling structural factor can be blamed for 192 Chapter 7 the ongoing destruction of the economy. Whatever may be said about the dreadful legacy of colonialism, the confrontational apartheid era, the constraints of the Cold War until 1989, or even the structural imbalances of the international economic system, in the early 1980s Zimbabwe enjoyed one of the most promising economies in Africa with fairly good infrastructures, an efficient public administration and a welltrained manpower. By late 2003 already, what was left was the fastestshrinking economy in the world,4 a wrecked state ignoring the law and derelict public infrastructures. From June 2003 on there was an illegal foreign exchange (black) market and roaring inflation. Since then the economy went from bad to worse. Was such an outcome so unexpected? Policy mistakes and bad management —which could be seen as accidental—are not convincing explanations . Rather, we focus on the behavior of the elite in the pursuit of absolute power and self-enrichment. Zimbabwe is no exception in a postcolonial Africa where the ‘‘big men’’5 logic prevailed in the context of the neopatrimonial state. However, one should not underestimate the specificities of each African country, the various mix of patrimonialization versus institutionalization, and the diversity of historical trajectories . The case of Zimbabwe is interesting inasmuch as the process was delayed by the late decolonization and the relatively high degree of institutionalization of the state, including an independent judiciary, on the eve of majority rule. The nascent but determined civic organizations and the buoyant private sector whose property rights were entrenched in the Lancaster House constitution were additional obstacles in the path of the new elite. After independence, the top echelon of the black nationalists, as well as their dependents and clients, slowly emerged as a kind of ‘‘state bourgeoisie ,’’6 taking advantage of its control of state resources, and whose greed and recklessness became more ominous in the late 1980s once the ruling party’s hegemony was no longer seriously challenged. However , in the 1990s, the growing crisis of public finances and the new call for economic liberalization provoked a change in tactics: ‘‘indigenization ’’ of the private sector became the new vehicle of this accumulation drive at a time when ‘‘straddling’’ positions7 in the private sector and the government or the parastatals became more systematic. After August 1998, Zimbabwe business interests in the DRC signaled a new stage in this process with Mafia-like behavior spreading fast among ZANU-PF elites (whether in the political, economic, or military sectors). All along the monopolistic control of political power was decisive for the success of such capital accumulation. State Bourgeoisie and Plunder of the Economy 193 The Patronage Benefits of...